In service: 10-8 Vol.14: Iss.6, 2014 by Justice Institute of British Columbia (Justice Institute of British Columbia) (Author)
A PEER READ PUBLICATION
A newsletter devoted to operational police officers in Canada.
Be Smart & Stay Safe Volume 14 Issue 6
The Canadian Association of Police Educators (CAPE) promotes excellence in law 
enforcement training  and education through the guidance of innovative research, program 
development, knowledge transfer, network facilitation, and collaborative training 
initiatives. In the changing  landscape of police training  many agencies are stretching their 
resources to do more with less. The goal of the 2015 CAPE conference is to promote 
discussion on hot topics in police training, highlighting collaboration as a mechanism to 
achieve effective and defensible training within the current economic climate.  
Sessions at the conference are designed to be short, fast-paced presentations followed by 
facilitated group discussions, panel discussions, or question and answer sessions with 
panelists to promote interaction and critical thinking. Innovations in police training in BC 
will be showcased throughout the conference and scheduled updates from various 
organizations and committees will promote collaboration. 
IN SERVICE: 10-8
CAPE 2015
Canadian Association of Police Educators
Effective & Defensible Training Through Collaboration
Conference: May 20-22, 2015
Pre-conference Workshop: May 19, 2015
More info on p. 4
Volume 14 Issue 6 - November/December 2014
PAGE 2
National	 Library	 of	 Canada	 
Cataloguing	 in	 Publication	 
Data
Main entry under title:
In service: 10-8. -- Vol. 1, no. 1 (June 2001)  
 Monthly
 Title from caption.
 “A newsletter devoted to operational police 
officers across British Columbia.”
       ISSN 1705-5717 = In service, 10-8
1. Police - British Columbia - Periodicals. 2. 
Police - Legal status, laws, etc. - Canada - 
Cases - Periodicals. I. Justice Institute of 
British Columbia. Police Academy. II. Title: In 
service, 10-8. III. Title: In service, ten-eight.
Highlights In This Issue
New Justice Appointed To Supreme Court 5
Manner Of Strip Search Matters: s. 8 Charter 
Breached
6
Firearm Need Not Also Meet Definition Of Weapon 10
Lawful Arrest Neuters Civil Claim 14
Corroborating Sources Enhances Reliability 16
Police Conduct Assessed By What they Did, Not 
Could have Done
17
Watching Detainee Did Not Breach s. 10(b) 20
Police Owe No Duty To Investigate 21
Officers May Use Experience In Making Decisions 22
Cell Phone Search Incident To Arrest Lawful, But 
Limited
24
Information Compelling, Credible & Corroborated: 
RGB Satisfied
28
Reasonable Grounds Assessed At Time Of Arrest 29
Penile Swab & Fingernail Clippings Proper As 
Incident To Arrest
32
Unless otherwise noted all articles are authored by 
Mike  Novakowski, MA, LLM. The articles contained 
herein are provided for information purposes only 
and are not to be construed as legal or other 
professional advice. The opinions expressed herein 
are not necessarily  the opinions of the Justice 
Institute of British Columbia. “In Service: 10-8” 
welcomes your comments or contributions to this 
newsletter.   
Upcoming Courses
Advanced	 Police	 Training
Advanced training  provides opportunities for skill 
development and career enhancement for 
municipal police officers. Training  is offered in 
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WHAT’S	 NEW	 FOR	 POLICE	 IN	 
THE	 LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
most recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
Becoming a critical thinker.
Vincent Ryan Ruggerio.
Australia: Wadsworth, (2014).
BF 455 R829 2015
Build your own rainbow:  a workbook for career 
and life management.
Barrie Hopson and Mike Scally.
Oxford, UK: Lifeskills International, (2014).
BF 637 S8 H667 2014
Collaborative learning  techniques: a handbook 
for college faculty.
Elizabeth F. Barkley, Claire Howell Major, K. Patricia 
Cross.
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, (2014)
LB 1032 B318 2014
Decision making and problem solving strategies.
John Adair.
Philadelphia, PA: Kogan Page Ltd, (2013).
HD 30.23 A43 2013
Develop your leadership skills.
John Adair.
London, UK: Kogan Page Limited, (2013).
HD 57.7 A2746 2013
A guide to the project management body of 
knowledge (PMBOK guide).
Newtown Square, PA: Project Management Institute, 
Inc., (2013).
HD 69 P75 G845 2013
Improve your writing.
Ron Fry.
Boston, MA: Cengage Learning, (2012).
LB 1047.3 F796 2012    
Influencer: the new science of leading change.
Joseph Grenny [and others].
New York,NY: McGraw-Hill Education, (2013).
BF 774 I54 2013
Interface design for learning: design strategies for 
learning experiences.
Dorian Peters.
Berkeley, CA: New Riders, (2014).
LB 1028.5 P47 2014
Interpersonal communication: relating to others.
Steven A. Beebe, Susan J. Beebe, Mark V. Redmond, 
Terri M. Geerinck, Lisa Salem-Wiseman.
Toronto,ON: Pearson, (2015).
BF 637 C45 I68 2015
Leadership 2030: the six megatrends you need to 
understand to lead your company into the future.
Georg Vielmetter and Yvonne Sell.
New York, NY: AMACOM, American Management 
Association, (2014).
HD 30.27 V54 2014
Learning  to lead: a workbook on becoming a 
leader.
Warren Bennis and Joan Goldsmith.
New York , NY: Basic Books, c2010.
HD 57.7 B463 2010
The lens of leadership:  being  the leader others 
want to follow.
Cory Bouck.
New York, NY: Aviva Publishing, (2013).
HD 57.7 B683 2013
The theory and practice of change management.
John Hayes.
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York, NY: 
Palgrave Macmillan, (2014).
HD 58.8 H39 2014
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Canadian Association of Police Educators
Effective & Defensible Training Through Collaboration
Conference: May 20-22, 2015
Pre-conference Workshop: May 19, 2015
Presentation topics at the 2015 CAPE Conference include:
• Hot topics in police training:
✓ Mental readiness
✓ Two-tiered policing
✓ The Economics of policing
• Training for Vancouver’s Downtown East Side
• The JIBC continuum of training
• Assessing in the real world:
✓ Outcomes based assessment
✓ Reality-based training and assessment
✓ Blended learning: e-learning for outcomes based assessment
• Developing provincial standards:
✓ BC’s Certified Use of Force Instructor Course (CUFIC)
✓ BC’s Firearms working group
✓ Police Services Division – working towards provincial standards in BC
• Assessment Centre
• National Training Inventory
• Collaboration in Police Training
• BC’s Crisis Intervention and De-Escalation training
A limited-capacity pre-CAPE workshop on curriculum mapping will be offered where 
participants will work directly with the BC Police Academy Curriculum Developer to 
map their curriculum to the Police Sector Council National Framework of Competencies.  
There will be opportunities to network and exchange ideas in an informal setting.
cape-educators.ca
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NEW	 JUSTICE	 APPOINTED	 TO	 
SUPREME	 COURT
On November 27, 2014 the Right Honourable 
Beverley McLachlin, Chief Justice of Canada, 
welcomed the appointment by Prime Minister 
Stephen Harper of Ms. Suzanne Côté to the 
Supreme Court of Canada.  “Ms. Côté is 
appointed directly from the Bar of Quebec, after 
a distinguished career as an advocate”, said 
Chief Justice McLachlin.  “She brings extensive 
expertise in commercial and civil law, as well as 
a wealth of experience in public law. I look 
forward to her contributions to the Court.”
 
Justice Côté was sworn-in as a judge of the 
Supreme Court of Canada before the Chief 
Justice and the other judges of the Court in a 
private ceremony on December 2, 2014. Justice 
Côté joins eight other judges comprising the 
Supreme Court of Canada. 
Judges of the Supreme Court of Canada
• Madam Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin
➡ appointed 1989
• Madam Justice Rosalie Silberman Abella
➡ appointed 2004
• Mr. Justice Marshall Rothstein
➡ appointed 2006
• Mr. Justice Thomas Albert Cromwell
➡ appointed 2008
• Mr. Justice Michael J. Moldaver
➡ appointed 2011
• Madam Justice Andromache Karakatsanis
➡ appointed 2011
• Mr. Justice Richard Wagner
➡ appointed 2012
• Mr. Justice Clément Gascon
➡ appointed 2014
• Madam Justice Suzanne Côté
➡ appointed 2014
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MANNER	 OF	 STRIP	 SEARCH	 
MATTERS:	 s.	 8	 CHARTER	 
BREACHED
R. v. Muller, 2014 ONCA 780
Police received information from two 
confidential informants. Both were 
drug  users and criminals, and their 
reliability was unconfirmed. They 
said that a man named “Biggie” was 
selling  crack cocaine out of an apartment belonging 
to another man (“Peter”). “Peter” received drugs in 
exchange for using  the  apartment. The information 
was current as one of the informants had bought 
drugs from “Biggie” earlier in the day. Biggie was 
described as being  a  big  black man, six  feet tall, 
with a large build, short brown hair in braids, and 
weighing  about 240 pounds. One informant told 
police that Biggie had bought a  handgun for 
protection, but he had not seen it. Police were able 
to identify the lessee of the apartment, and he 
matched the informants’ description of “Peter”. On 
the basis of this information, the police obtained a  s. 
11 Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA) 
search warrant, which was executed by the 
Emergency Services Unit. 
As the search warrant was being  executed, police 
officers were conducting  surveillance outside the 
building  to ensure people did not escape or throw 
drugs off the balcony. They noticed the accused walk 
out of the building  through a pedestrian exit (side 
door)  located not far from the apartment being 
searched. He fit Biggie’s general description: a six 
foot tall black man with a large build. The officers, 
wearing  clothing  that clearly identified them as 
police, approached the accused on foot. As they did, 
he discarded a digital scale and continued to walk 
away. The scale had a  residue on it resembling  crack 
cocaine. The officers caught up  to the accused and 
asked him for identification. He identified himself 
orally and produced no identity documents. He was 
arrested for possessing  crack cocaine for the purpose 
of trafficking, advised of his right to counsel, and 
frisk searched. Three cellphones and some money 
were found in his possession, but no drugs, debt lists 
or other common indicia of drug  trafficking. 
Thinking  the accused was Biggie and that he was 
trying  to hide something  from them, he was taken to 
the police station to be strip searched.
At the police station, the accused was strip  searched 
by two male police officers in a  strip  search room. 
He was asked to remove his clothing, piece by 
piece, and hand them over. When naked, he was 
asked to turn around and “bend over and spread his 
butt cheeks.” As he bent over, a plastic bag  inside 
another bag  was visibly concealed between his 
buttocks. An officer removed the bag  and found 
crack cocaine, cocaine and a dozen oxycodone 
tablets inside it. The search was conducted in a room 
with the door open, and was recorded on video and 
electronically viewable by others in the station. The 
officers did not obtain supervisory approval for the 
strip search. Four other people arrested inside the 
apartment were also subsequently strip searched at 
the police station, but nothing was found on them.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The judge found both the arrest and the 
incidental searches (frisk and strip  search) 
lawful. He concluded that the information 
provided by the informants, standing 
alone, was insufficient to justify the arrest. But the 
cumulative effect of the information along  with the 
observations of the surveillance officers provided the 
police with requisite  reasonable grounds to make 
the arrest. The accused was the physically similar to 
Biggie’s description, the timing  an location of the 
accused’s departure from the building  and his 
attempt to discard a digital scale and move away 
from the police added to the informant information.
As for the strip  search, the judge found it too was 
lawful. The police had the necessary grounds to 
justify  it. First, the accused had discarded a digital 
scale, signalling  he was trying  to conceal material 
from the police. Second, although the frisk  revealed 
no drugs, police found money and three cell 
phones, further enhancing  the officers’ grounds to 
believe the accused was involved in the sale of 
drugs. Finally, the accused was evasive during  his 
arrest, refusing  to produce identification or provide 
an address. “In these circumstances, the officer 
believed that the accused was trying  to hide 
Volume 14 Issue 6 - November/December 2014
PAGE 7
something  from him,” said the judge. “The evasive 
manner of the  accused, together with his earlier 
attempt to dispose of evidence, offered some basis 
for believing  that he might have taken steps to 
conceal evidence of the offence.” The judge  was 
also satisfied the strip  search, although not a model 
one, was not conducted in an unreasonable manner. 
There was no evidence the open door or electronic 
video actually  caused a  privacy breach. There were 
grounds justifying  the  search procedure and the lack 
of supervisory approval did not change this. Finally, 
the bag  was concealed between the accused’s 
buttocks and was not in his anus. There was no 
Charter breach, the evidence was admissible and the 
accused was convicted.
Ontario Court of Appeal
Th e a c c u s e d a p p e a l e d h i s 
convictions arguing  that both his 
warrantless arrest and the searches 
that followed were unlawful,. 
Further, he suggested that the had not been 
conducted in a reasonable manner. 
Arrest (& Frisk)
The accused argued his arrest was unlawful because 
the police did not have reasonable grounds upon 
which to arrest him. He contended that the police 
did not reasonably believe  that he had possession of 
drugs. Accordingly the incidental searches that 
followed were unreasonable. The Crown, on the 
other hand, argued that the reasonable grounds 
standard had been met; it was not equivalent to 
“proof beyond a reasonable doubt” or even “a prima 
facie case”. In the Crown’s opinion, the cumulative 
effect of all the  information known to the police 
prior to the accused’s arrest supported an objectively 
reasonable belief that he was in possession of crack 
cocaine for the purpose of trafficking  and, therefore, 
the arrest and search incident to the arrest were 
lawful.
Under s. 495(1)(a)  of the  Criminal Code a peace 
officer is permitted to make a warrantless arrest if 
they believe, on reasonable grounds, that a person 
has committed or is about to commit an indictable 
offence. In describing  this power, Justice Watt, 
writing the Court of Appeal’s judgment, stated:
[T]he arresting officer must subjectively have 
reasonable grounds on which to base the arrest. 
However, that on its own is not enough to make 
the arrest lawful. In addition, those grounds must 
be justifiable from an objective point of view. A 
reasonable person placed in the position of the 
officer must be able to conclude there were 
indeed reasonable grounds for the arrest. 
[references omitted, para. 36]
Justice Watt noted that the information provided by 
the confidential informants, by  itself, was insufficient 
to meet the reasonable grounds threshold. Although 
“the information was somewhat specific”, it can 
from one untested source and one whose reliability 
was unverified. However, the police had more than 
just the information. The accused matched “Biggie’s” 
general description, walked out of the building  as a 
CDSA warrant was being  executed, and discarded a 
digital scale covered with a residue resembling  crack 
cocaine when officers approached. “In combination, 
the information provided by the informants, coupled 
with the observations made of the [accused’s] 
behaviour, met the standard imposed by s. 495(1)(a) 
of the  Criminal Code,” said Justice Watt. “The proper 
issue was not whether the police had reasonable 
grounds to believe the  pedestrian was Biggie, but 
rather, whether they  had reasonable grounds to 
believe the pedestrian had been or was in possession 
of drugs for the purpose of trafficking.”
“[T]he arresting officer must subjectively have reasonable grounds on which to base the 
arrest. However, that on its own is not enough to make the arrest lawful. In addition, 
those grounds must be justifiable from an objective point of view. A reasonable person 
placed in the position of the officer must be able to conclude there were indeed 
reasonable grounds for the arrest.”
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Following  a lawful arrest, the police may conduct a 
search incidental to that arrest. “A search incident to 
arrest derives its authority from the lawful arrest and 
requires no independent justification, either at 
common law or under the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms,” said Justice Watt. “Breaking 
this down, for a search to be justified as an incident 
to arrest, the arrest itself must have been lawful and 
the search must have been 
incident to the arrest, 
meaning  the search must 
have related to the reasons 
for the  arrest itself.” As for 
this case, the Court of 
Appeal stated: 
The lawful arrest of the [accused] permitted the 
police to conduct a frisk search of him incidental 
to the arrest. In this case, the frisk search was 
incidental because it related to the reasons for 
the arrest. The arrest was for the possession of 
drugs for the purpose of trafficking. The purpose 
of the frisk search was to discover evidence of 
the offence: drugs or drug paraphernalia on the 
[accused’s] person. [references omitted, para. 
43]
Strip Search
As for the strip  search, the accused contended that 
there  were no reasonable grounds upon which it 
could be based such that the presumption of 
unreasonableness was rebutted. He suggested that 
the trial judge combined neutral factors (possession 
of cellphones), misapprehensions of evidence (the 
accused’s refusal to identify himself), and a negative 
factor (failure to find drugs on the frisk  search)  as 
positive evidence sufficient to justify a strip  search 
for drugs. The Crown, on the other hand, submitted 
that the strip  search was reasonable in the 
circumstances. The accused had been lawfully 
arrested and frisked, and the purpose of the strip 
search was to discover evidence of contraband or 
other drug  paraphernalia. The money and 
cellphones found, as well as the accused’s refusal to 
produce identification or provide an address, 
solidified the grounds required to justify the strip 
search.
Justice Watt outlined several principles governing  a 
strip search:
• “The more intrusive the search, the greater the 
degree of justification and constitutional 
protection appropriate;
• “Strip searches involve a significant and direct 
interference with personal privacy and can be 
humiliating, embarrassing  and degrading  for 
those subjected to them.
• “Where a  strip  search is justified as an incident 
to arrest, the arrest itself must be lawful. The 
search must also be incident to the arrest. In 
other words, the search must be related to the 
purpose of the arrest. 
• “The reasonableness of the  search for evidence, 
including  the reasonableness of the strip  search, 
is governed by the need to preserve  evidence 
and prevent its disposal by the arrested person. 
Where arresting  officers suspect the arrested 
person may have secreted evidence on areas of 
his or her body that can only be exposed by a 
strip search, the risk of disposal must be 
reasonably assessed in all the circumstance.
• “The mere possibility that an individual may be 
concealing  drugs on his or her person is not 
sufficient to justify a strip search of that person.
• “Strip searches conducted as a  matter of routine 
policy, even if executed in a reasonable 
manner, are not reasonable within s. 8 of the 
Charter. Compelling  reasons, rooted in the 
circumstances of the arrest, are  required to 
render a  strip  search reasonable, even where 
the execution is flawless. 
• “The fact that police have reasonable grounds 
to arrest a person without warrant under s. 495
“Strip searches conducted as a matter of 
routine policy, even if executed in a 
reasonable manner, are not reasonable 
within s. 8 of the Charter. Compelling 
reasons, rooted in the circumstances of 
the arrest, are required to render a strip 
search reasonable, even where the 
execution is flawless.”
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(1)(a)  does not, on its own, clothe them with 
automatic authority to carry out a strip  search. 
This is so even where the strip  search qualifies 
as incidental to a  lawful arrest. Something 
further relating  to the purpose of the strip 
search is required. That something  further is that 
the police must have reasonable and probable 
grounds for concluding  a strip search is 
necessary  in the specific circumstances of the 
arrest
In this case, the arrest was lawful. The arrest was for 
drug  trafficking  and the police were searching  for 
evidence related to his arrest - possessing  crack 
cocaine for the  purpose of trafficking. Justice Watt 
also found the trial judge did not err in determining 
that the police had the grounds necessary to conduct 
the strip search for the purpose of discovering 
evidence relating  to drug  trafficking. In other words, 
the police had reasonable and probable  grounds to 
believe a strip  search was necessary in the 
circumstances of the arrest. 
Although, the circumstances surrounding  the 
accused’s identification were not relevant, the other 
circumstances were properly taken into account. The 
fact that no drugs were found on the frisk search and 
the arresting  officer’s experience with drug  dealers 
concealing  crack cocaine “in their underwear or in 
their butt cheeks” were  legitimate factors to 
consider. Further, the possession of three cellphones 
and a small quantity of cash, along  with the arresting 
officer’s experience that the presence of multiple 
cellphones, was consistent with drug  trafficking, was 
also properly considered. Finally, police evidence 
about the frequency of finding  drugs during  the strip 
search of a suspected cocaine trafficker as 7.5% was 
also relevant, although not determinative. 
In R. v. Golden the Supreme Court of Canada 
provided a framework for the police to follow in 
conducting a Charter compliant strip search by 
offering guidelines, in the form of questions:
• Can the strip search be conducted at the police 
station and, if not, why not?
• Will the strip search be conducted 
in a manner that ensures the health 
and safety of all involved?
• Will the strip search be authorized 
by a police officer acting in a 
supervisory capacity?
• Has it been ensured that the police 
officer(s) carrying out the strip 
search are of the same gender as 
the individual being searched?
• Will the number of police officers 
involved in the search be no more 
than is reasonably necessary in the 
circumstances?
• What is the minimum of force 
necessary to conduct the strip 
search?
• Will the strip search be carried out in a private 
area such that no one other than the individuals 
engaged in the search can observe the search?
• Will the strip search be conducted as quickly as 
possible and in a way that ensures that the person 
is not completely undressed at any one time?
• Will the strip search involve only a visual inspection 
of the arrestee’s genital and anal areas without any 
physical contact?
• If the visual inspection reveals the presence of a 
weapon or evidence in a body cavity (not including 
the mouth), will the detainee be given the option of 
removing the object himself or of having the object 
removed by a trained medical professional?
•  Will a proper record be kept of the reasons for 
and the manner in which the strip search was 
conducted?
For a strip search to be constitutionally valid, it 
must be:
• Conducted as an incident to a lawful 
arrest;
• Conducted for the purpose of discovering 
weapons or evidence on the body of the 
arrested person related to the reason for 
the arrest;
• Based on reasonable and probable 
grounds for concluding  a strip search is 
necessary in the circumstances of the 
arrest; and
• Conducted in a reasonable manner.
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Manner of Search
The accused argued that the manner in which the 
strip search was conducted was not reasonable. He 
was required to face an open door, his genitalia 
were exposed directly to anybody who may pass by 
and could be seen indirectly by video to anyone 
with access to it. He was also not asked whether he 
consented to the  video recording  of the search. The 
Crown, on the contrary, submitted that the search 
was conducted reasonably because it was generally 
compliant with the guidelines established by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Golden, [2001] 3 
S.C.R. 679.
Despite the search being  carried out by two officers 
of the same gender in an appropriate  room, the 
Court of Appeal found the manner of the search to 
be unreasonable based on the following factors:
• No supervisory authorization was sought to 
conduct the strip search.
• The door to the strip  search room was left open 
while the search was conducted, contrary  to 
usual practice. The accused, standing  naked, 
faced the  open door into a hallway accessible 
by others of either gender. 
• The search was videotaped and could be 
viewed electronically by others at various 
places in the police station.
• The evidence was unclear whether the accused 
had been informed he was being videotaped.
• He was not given the choice to remove the 
plastic bag  from between his buttocks himself. 
Instead, a police officer removed it.
• No adequate record of the strip  search was 
created other than the videotape.
Although the warrantless arrest was lawful and the 
criteria for a strip  search met, the  manner in which 
the strip  search was conducted was unreasonable. 
The accused’s appeal was allowed, his convictions 
were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.  
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
FIREARM	 NEED	 NOT	 ALSO	 MEET	 
DEFINITION	 OF	 WEAPON
R. v. Dunn, 2014 SCC 69
A private investigator saw the 
accused pull a pistol out of his jacket 
pocket, point it at a man and then 
leave in his car. Police  were called 
and attended the  accused’s trailer 
where  they found a black handgun resting  on a chair 
in a shed beside the trailer. The handgun was a 
Crosman Pro77 airgun that fired .177 calibre 
spherical BBs propelled by means of compressed air 
from a canister. It was fully  functional and loaded 
with a partly used CO2 cartridge. It had a warning 
on the side: 
There was no ammunition in the magazine. The 
accused was charged with several offences including 
handling  a firearm in a careless manner, carrying  a 
weapon for a purpose  dangerous to the public 
peace, and carrying a concealed weapon.
Ontario Court of Justice
A firearms examiner testified that the 
airgun had an average velocity of 261.41 
feet per second (ft/s). He said this type of 
airgun could be purchased without 
producing  any documentation, as long  as the 
muzzle velocity did not exceed 500 ft/s. The expert 
also cited a scientific study which set a  standard for 
a barrelled object causing  death or bodily injury. 
This study found that any shot exceeding  214 ft/s 
was capable of causing  serious injury to a pig’s eye. 
A pig’s eye is similar in size and composition to that 
of a human. As well, the study determined that a 
projectile travelling  at 246 ft/s would penetrate a 
pig’s eye 50% of the time (known as the V50 
standard).
The judge, noting  the airgun was not a “real powder 
fired bullet shooting  gun,” ruled that the Crown was 
required to prove it was also a weapon as defined in 
s. 2 of the Criminal Code. 
Warning, not a toy, misuse can cause 
fatal injury. Before using read owner’s 
manual available from Crosman Corp.
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Since the Crown failed to prove that the airgun was 
used or intended for use in causing  death or injury 
or to threaten or intimidate, the judge ruled that it 
was not a “weapon” and therefore not a  “firearm.” 
The accused was acquitted.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The Crown argued that a 
barrelled device that satisfied 
the Criminal Code  definition of 
“firearm” need not also meet 
the definition of “weapon.” This 
interpretative issue arises 
because  each definition refers to the other and there 
were differing  views in the case law about whether 
or not a “firearm” is always a weapon irrespective of 
whether it meets the definition of “weapon” (by its 
use or the intent of its possessor). Justice Rosenberg, 
writing  the unanimous decision, framed the question 
this way:
[B]ecause “firearm” is defined as “a barrelled 
weapon”, the question arises whether the 
prosecution must prove not only that the object 
discharges a shot, bullet or other projectile that 
is capable of causing serious bodily injury or 
death, but also that it meets subsections (a) or (b) 
in the definition of “weapon”; namely, that the 
object was used, designed to be used or 
intended for use in causing  death or injury to 
any person or for the purpose of threatening  or 
intimidating any person. Or, is the word 
“weapon” used in the definition of “firearm” 
only in a descriptive sense, such that it is not a 
formal element of the definition requiring  proof? 
The definition of “weapon”, in turn, refers to 
“firearm”. The concluding phrase in that 
definition, “without restricting  the generality of 
the foregoing, includes a firearm”, appears to 
exclude the used, designed or intended for use 
requirements and deems a firearm to be a 
weapon.” [para. 16]
Since there were differing  case law decisions on this 
matter, a five (5) judge panel heard the case.
Is a Firearm Always a Weapon?
Justice Rosenberg  ruled that the term “weapon” in 
the definition of “firearm,” was simply a descriptor 
and not a formal element. Thus, barreled objects 
meeting  the definition of “firearm” need not also 
meet the  definition in paragraphs (a)  or (b)  of 
“weapon”:
In my view, ... an object, whether it is a 
conventional powder-fired gun or a spring or gas 
fired gun, will fall within the definition of 
‘firearm’ in s. 2 provided there is proof that any 
shot, bullet or other projectile can be discharged 
from the object and that it is capable of causing 
serious bodily injury or death to a person. [para. 
34]
Thus, the focus becomes the objects nature as a 
barreled device and its capability (to cause serious 
bodily injury or death), not the intent of its possessor 
nor the use made of it. The Court of Appeal noted 
that certain weapons are deemed not to be firearms 
if the shot, bullet or other projectile does not exceed 
a muzzle velocity of 152.4 m/s (500 ft/s). However, 
this velocity threshold deeming  weapons as non-
“[A]n object, whether it is a conventional powder-fired gun or a spring or gas fired gun, 
will fall within the definition of ‘firearm’ in s. 2 provided there is proof that any shot, bullet 
or other projectile can be discharged from the object and that it is capable of causing 
serious bodily injury or death to a person.”
“weapon” means any thing  used, designed to be 
used or intended for use
(a)   in causing death or injury to any person, or
(b)   for the purpose of threatening  or intimidating 
any person
and, without restricting  the generality of the 
foregoing, includes a firearm.
500 ft/s = 152.4 m/s
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firearms is only in relation to specific offences 
concerning  the strict licensing  regime of the Firearms 
Act and Criminal Code (eg. unauthorized 
possession, trafficking, importing/ exporting, failing 
to report or false reporting  of lost, found, or 
destroyed firearms). Other offences such as carrying 
a concealed weapon (s. 90), careless handling  (s. 
86), and possession for a dangerous purpose (s. 88) 
are not subject to the 152.4 m/s threshold.
Justice Rosenberg  also examined the legislative 
scheme and found there were three different 
categories (or groups) of barrelled objects:
Group One: Barrelled objects shooting  a 
projectile with a velocity of less than 214 ft./s. (or 
246 ft./s., using  the V50 standard) are not firearms 
because they are not capable of serious injury or 
death; these objects will only be considered 
weapons, and thus fall within a prohibition such 
as the concealed weapon prohibition in s. 90, if 
they meet paras. (a) or (b) in the definition of 
“weapon”.
Group Two: Barrelled objects shooting  a 
projectile with a velocity of more than 214 ft./s. 
(or 246 ft./s., using the V50 standard) are firearms, 
because they are capable of causing serious 
injury or death, whether or not they also meet 
paras. (a) or (b) in the definition of “weapon”; 
these weapons will fall within a prohibition such 
as that found in s. 90. Nevertheless, they will not 
be subject to the stricter licensing regime in the 
Criminal Code and the Firearms Act if they fall 
within one of the exemptions in s. 84(3), for 
example, if the velocity of the projectile does not 
exceed 500 f/ s.
Group Three: Barrelled objects shooting  a 
projectile with a velocity of more than 500 f./s. 
These objects fall within the definition of firearm 
for all purposes of the Criminal Code and the 
Firearms Act and must be licensed accordingly. 
Some airguns and most powder-fired bullet 
shooting  guns will fall with in this regime. At a 
minimum, ... Group Three objects do not need to 
meet the para. (a) or (b) definition of weapon to 
be deemed to be weapons. [paras. 44-46]
The legislative history, its object (public safety)  and 
the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words 
used also supported the Court’s view of its 
interpretation.
The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the accused’s 
acquittals for careless handling  of a  firearm, carrying 
a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public 
peace, and carrying  a  concealed weapon were set 
aside and a new trial was ordered.
Supreme Court of Canada
T h e a c c u s e d f u r t h e r 
appealed to the Supreme 
Court of Canada submitting 
that the airgun, although 
falling  within the definition 
of a “firearm”, must also 
meet the definition of “weapon” in s. 2 of the 
Criminal Code. In a short oral judgment, the seven 
member panel of the Supreme Court hearing  the 
case agreed with Justice Rosenberg’s reasons and 
dismissed the accused’s arguments.  
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
Criminal Code sections where a barrelled weapon with a muzzle velocity of 152.4 m/s or less is 
not  considered a “firearm” (see s. 84 (3)(d))
91 Unauthorized possession of firearm 101 Transfer firearm without authority
92 Possess firearm knowing possession unauthorized 103 Importing/exporting firearm knowing it is unauthorized
93 Possess firearm at unauthorized place 104 Unauthorized importing/exporting
94 Unauthorized possession of firearm in motor vehicle 105 Losing or finding without reporting or delivering
95 Possess prohibited/restricted firearm with ammunition 106 Destroying without reporting
99 Weapons trafficking 107 False statements concerning loss, theft or destruction
100 Possess firearm for the purpose of trafficking 117.03 Seizure on failure to produce authorization
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VIOLENT	 KICK	 TO	 COP	 CAR	 
CAUSED	 STATE	 OF	 FEAR	 
R. v. Horton, 2014 ONCA 616 
During  the G20 summit in Toronto, 
the accused approached a marked 
police car that was stopped on a 
downtown street in broad daylight. 
The car had its drivers window closed 
but its rear window on the driver’s side had already 
been smashed out and its windshield was also 
broken. A police officer was seated in the driver’s 
seat. He was in uniform, wearing  a bright yellow 
jacket with reflective markings, had the word 
“Police” on the front and back, and police patches 
on each sleeve. The accused proceeded to kick  the 
upper portion of the driver’s door and window 
twice, but the window did not break.
Ontario Court of Justice
The accused testified he did not know 
anyone was inside the police  cruiser. He 
said he kicked the door because he was 
disgruntled at the abusive treatment by 
police of some G20 demonstrators. The judge, 
however, found the  accused had a clear and 
unobstructed view of the police car and the driver’s 
door window when he kicked it. The accused was 
found guilty of intimidating  a justice  system 
participant and assaulting  a police officer. The judge 
found that kicking  the window of the cruiser was an 
attempt by the accused to apply force  to the officer 
either directly, or by causing  the glass to shatter and 
strike the officer. Further, in the circumstances, with 
the windshield already damaged and the rear driver’s 
side window broken out, the officer could 
reasonably believe the accused had the present 
ability to carry out his purpose. He was sentenced to 
10 months in jail, prohibited from weapons, ordered 
to provide a DNA sample, and placed on probation.
 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused contended that the 
trial judge failed to properly 
consider evidence relevant to his 
knowledge about whether the 
marked police cruiser was occupied by a  police 
officer, despite it occurring  during  broad daylight. 
Furthermore, he submitted that the trial judge  was 
mistaken in concluding  the essential elements of 
assaulting  a peace officer and intimidating  a  justice 
system participant had been proven.
Knowledge
The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge was 
aware that the accused denied he  knew the car was 
occupied. However, on the evidence, the trial judge 
was entitled to find the accused had a clear and 
unobstructed view. “The video itself, even on a 
casual viewing, reduces to sheer fantasy any 
suggestion that the  [accused] could not or did not 
see a person in the driver’s seat wearing  a bright 
yellow jacket with police markings on it,” said the 
Appeal Court.
Essential Elements
The trial judge also did not err in concluding  that the 
essential elements for assaulting  a peace officer had 
been proven. It was open to her to find an assault 
BY THE BOOK:
Intimidation	 of	 a	 Justice 	 System	 Participant: 
Criminal Code
s. 423.1 (1) No person shall, without lawful 
authority, engage in conduct referred to in 
subsection (2) with the intent to provoke a 
state of fear in ... (b) a justice system 
participant in order to impede him or her in 
the performance of his or her duties ... .
Prohibited conduct
(2) The conduct referred to in subsection (1) consists of
(a) using violence against a justice system participant ... or 
destroying or causing damage to the property of any of those 
persons; ...
Punishment
(3) Every person who contravenes this section is guilty of an 
indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term 
of not more than fourteen years.
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under s. 265 (1)(b)  of the Criminal Code had 
occurred. The kicking  was an attempt to apply  force 
to the officer who reasonably believed the accused 
had the ability at that time to carry out his purpose.
As for the conviction of intimidating  a justice system 
participant under s. 423.1 of the Criminal Code, it 
too was proper. The Court of Appeal was satisfied 
that the accused’s conduct met the elements of the 
offence, stating:
The police officer who occupied the driver’s seat 
of the marked police vehicle was a peace officer 
engaged in the exercise of his duties, monitoring 
the activities of an unruly crowd of protesters 
engaged in damaging property in the downtown 
area of Canada’s largest city. On any reasonable 
assessment, the evidence could support an 
inference that the violent kicks aimed at the 
driver’s door and window of the cruiser were 
intended to cause and did cause more than a 
momentary state of fear in the officer to impede 
him in the performance of his duties. For only 
the second time in his lengthy police career, the 
officer made a 10-33 call. And that was enough 
to establish the [accused’s] guilt under s. 423.1
(1) of the Criminal Code.
Assault
The Court of Appeal also refused to stay  the 
accused’s conviction for assaulting  a peace officer 
because  it did not violate the rule against multiple 
convictions for the same delict. Although there was 
a sufficient factual nexus between the assault and 
intimidating  a justice system participant since they 
were grounded on the same conduct, there was no 
legal nexus between them. “The offence of s. 423.1 
contains additional fault elements, the ulterior intent 
to provoke a  state of fear in the justice system 
participant, that is absent from the offence of 
assaulting  a peace  officer in the execution of his 
duties,” said the Court of Appeal. Thus, the rule 
against multiple convictions was not applicable.
The accused’s appeal against his convictions was 
dismissed.  
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
LAWFUL	 ARREST	 NEUTERS	 CIVIL	 
CLAIM
Maxwell v. Wal-Mart, 2014 ABCA 383
                                                                                                      
The plaintiff purchased a number of 
items from Wal-Mart with his wife, 
including  a television. He pocketed 
the receipt but refused to produce it 
when a Wal-Mart greeter asked to 
see it. He continued out of the store  and into the 
parking  lot. The store manager was called and 
confronted the plaintiff. He again refused to show 
any proof of purchase. Loss prevention officers 
(LPOs)  arrived and the plaintiff’s wife called 911. A 
scuffle ensued and the plaintiff kicked one LPO in 
the groin and twisted the arm of another. His own 
head also struck and dented an adjacent truck. A 
police officer enroute  to the call understood that 
Wal-Mart LPOs were trying  to arrest someone over a 
TV following  a dispute about a receipt and this 
person was fighting back. 
When he arrived, the officer placed the plaintiff 
under arrest for theft and assault based on the 
information obtained from the police radio and 
computer, and bystanders pointing  the plaintiff out 
as the suspect. After frisking  the plaintiff, the officer 
found a receipt for the television. He then realized 
the television was not stolen, but placed the 
handcuffed plaintiff in the police car, subsequently 
providing  him with Charter warnings and cautioning 
him for assault, mischief, and two counts of assault 
with intent to resist arrest. At his criminal trial, the 
plaintiff was ultimately acquitted of all charges, the 
judge finding  that the  store employees had no power 
of arrest where no actual theft occurred and that the 
force the plaintiff used to resist was reasonable in all 
the circumstances. The plaintiff then sued a number 
of defendants, including the arresting officer.
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench 
The arresting  officer, among  others, 
sought summary dismissal of the claims 
against him which included negligent 
investigation, wrongful arrest, unlawful 
search, continued arrest, false imprisonment, and 
malicious prosecution. He contended that he met 
the standard of care for arrest in compliance with s. 
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495 of the Criminal Code. He said he subjectively 
had reasonable and probable grounds on which to 
base the arrest, and those grounds were justifiable 
from an objective point of view. The judge dismissed 
the claims against the police, finding  none of them 
would have any chance of success, even when 
viewing  the evidence most favourably to the 
plaintiff. 
Negligent Investigation
The duty of care owed to suspects during  an 
investigation is measured by the  standard of a 
reasonable officer in similar circumstances. “The 
standard required of [the  arresting  officer] was not 
perfection, as judged in hindsight; it allows for errors 
in judgment,” said the judge. “The circumstances in 
this case included urgency in preventing  further 
assault. [The arresting  officer] was entitled to rely on 
the information he had received. He was not 
required to complete the investigation prior to the 
arrest. He was not required to exhaust all possible 
avenues of inquiry, to interview all potential 
witnesses, including  the person to be charged, or to 
rule out the Plaintiff’s possible  defences.” Further, 
while the plaintiff may not have had a legal 
obligation to provide the receipt voluntarily, had he 
done so he may have resolved any confusion about 
the theft. 
Wrongful Arrest
The arrest was lawful under s. 495 of the Criminal 
Code. The officer had reasonable grounds (both 
subjectively and objectively)  to believe that the 
plaintiff had committed an indictable offence. Both 
theft and assault are indictable offences, giving  rise 
to s. 495 arrest powers. There was no need to 
establish a prima facie case for conviction at the 
arrest stage, nor was the arresting  officer required to 
obtain a version of events from the person to be 
charged, nor to rule  out possible defences to the 
charge. “An officer cannot ignore information which 
exonerates,” said the judge. “However, a police 
officer is expected to do what s/he can in the 
circumstances, and need not solve the case before 
arresting  someone reasonably believed to have 
committed an offence.” It was reasonable for the 
police officer to conclude that the plaintiff was 
probably  struggling  with Wal-Mart staff after 
attempting  to steal a television. The fact the plaintiff 
was acquitted at trial did not, by itself, support a 
cause of action against the arresting  police officer. 
The officer continued his investigation following  the 
arrest, which did not render it unlawful. 
Unlawful Search
The search was incidental to the arrest and was 
justifiable for safety  and evidence gathering 
purposes. The frisk  search revealed the receipt for 
the television and, as a result, no further steps were 
taken in relation to a theft charge.  
Continued Arrest
The continued detention was lawful because 
reasonable grounds continued to exist. The officer 
had information from witnesses that the plaintiff had 
shoved a store manager when the manager asked to 
see a receipt for the television, twisted an LPO’s 
arms, and kicked another in the groin while 
damaging  a vehicle during  the altercation. The 
officer had reasonable grounds to continue the 
arrest for assault, mischief and assault with intent to 
resist arrest. “[The arresting  officer] was not required 
to determine whether the Plaintiff’s possession of the 
concealed receipt would ultimately exonerate him 
from criminal liability  for engaging  in a violent 
struggle.”
False Imprisonment
The police did not take an unreasonable amount of 
time to process the complainant, a maximum of 2.5 
hours for the arrest, transport, and release after the 
necessary  paperwork was complete. There was no 
evidence this process did not occur in a reasonably 
timely fashion, or that the plaintiff was purposefully 
held longer than was necessary or subjected to 
abusive treatment or conditions.
Malicious Prosecution
Although the court proceedings against the plaintiff 
were  terminated in his favour, there  was no 
evidence of an absence of reasonable and probable 
cause, or an improper motive by the arresting  officer 
(malice). The primary purpose for the arrest and 
prosecution was nothing  other than enforcement of 
the law. 
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Alberta Court of Appeal
The plaintiff appealed the summary 
dismissal of his claims against 
police. He argued that, because he 
was eventually acquitted on the 
criminal charges brought against him, his arrest was 
improper and he should never have been arrested in 
the first place. Thus, the police should be liable to 
pay him monetary damages. But the Court of Appeal 
found otherwise:
Where an accused person is ultimately 
acquitted, an arresting police officer is not liable 
for arresting that person where he or she 
subjectively has reasonable and probable 
grounds upon which to make an arrest, grounds 
which must additionally be justifiable from an 
objective point of view. [reference omitted, para. 
20]
Nor is negligence presumed where a police officer 
arrests a  person. Here, the arresting  officer deposed 
that he believed he had reasonable  and probable 
grounds to arrest the plaintiff. The Queen’s Bench 
judge agreed, concluding  the officer had both a 
subjective belief and reasonably objective grounds 
for the arrest. There was no evidence the police 
acted other than as reasonable officers would act, in 
the circumstances at and before the arrest. “In 
particular, the fact that the 911 call was initiated by 
[the plaintiff’s wife] rather than by a Wal-Mart 
employee did not compel [the arresting  officer] to 
take any further steps prior to arrest, such as 
obtaining  [the plaintiff’s] version of events, if other 
evidence formed reasonable and probable grounds,” 
said the Court of Appeal. “While the [Queen’s 
Bench] judge was obliged to attach the most 
favourable interpretation of evidence before him in 
making  his decision, that interpretation does not 
compel the  conclusion that the arrest was improper 
and actionable because [the arresting  officer] 
arrested [the plaintiff] after the Wal-Mart employees 
already had him under arrest, nor arrested him in the 
face of knowledge that a store employee initiated 
physical contact when trying  to grab  the straps of the 
television as he took it out of the store.” 
The plaintiff had failed to establish that the Queen’s 
Bench judge committed palpable and overriding 
error in dismissing  the claims against the police. The 
plaintiff’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.com
CORROBORATING	 SOURCES	 
ENHANCE	 RELIABILITY
R. v. K., 2014 MBCA 97                       
The accused’s girlfriend called police 
after discovering  child pornography 
on his family’s computer. The 
accused had been housesitting  at his 
parents’ place and his girlfriend had 
found the materials while using  the computer under 
his user name. She showed her friend the images to 
confirm they were  child pornography. The police 
obtained statements from the two women and 
subsequently applied for and executed a search 
warrant for the computer at the accused's parents’ 
home. Thousands of images of prepubescent females 
were found in three separate folders downloaded to 
the computer, including  140 images the accused 
admitted were child pornography. 
Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench  
Although the images as described by the 
girlfriend may not have resulted in a 
conviction, the judge found that the 
descriptions of what was observed by the 
girlfriend and her friend were sufficient to constitute 
reasonable grounds to believe that evidence of the 
offence of possession of child pornography would be 
found on the computer.  The judge also noted that 
“Where an accused person is ultimately acquitted, an arresting police officer is not liable 
for arresting that person where he or she subjectively has reasonable and probable 
grounds upon which to make an arrest, grounds which must additionally be justifiable 
from an objective point of view.”
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the information in the ITO was reliable because it 
was first-hand, detailed, corroborated as between 
the girlfriend and her friend on a  number of 
important and relevant issues, and was provided by 
witnesses rather than unnamed informants.  The 
accused’s application to quash the search warrant 
was dismissed, the evidence was admissible, and the 
accused was convicted of possessing  child 
pornography.
Manitoba Court of Appeal
The accused appealed his child 
pornography conviction by arguing 
the police breached his s. 8  Charter 
rights and the evidence found on 
the computer seized from his parents’ house should 
have been excluded under s. 24(2). In his view, the 
ITO was insufficient because there was no 
evidentiary basis for the issuing  justice  to conclude 
that the  images viewed by the women amounted to 
child pornography as defined in s. 163.1(1) of the 
Criminal Code.  
 
The Court of Appeal found the trial judge properly 
applied the standard of review for a search warrant. 
He did not substitute his opinion for that of the 
authorizing  judge, but rather determined whether, 
on the basis of the evidence, the  judge who 
authorized the warrant could have done so. Justice 
Cameron, writing  the Court of Appeal’s judgment, 
stated:
While the images described by the girlfriend 
ultimately may or may not have led to a 
conviction for possession of child pornography 
under the Code, in my view, they constituted a 
sufficient basis for the issuing justice to have 
concluded that there were reasonable and 
probable grounds to believe that the accused 
was in possession of child pornography and that 
evidence with respect to that offence would be 
found on the computer. [para. 10]
In this case, the ITO contained sufficient reliable 
evidence to support the issuance of the  search 
warrant. The fact the information provided by the 
accused’s girlfriend was corroborated by  her friend 
added to its reliability. “Cross-corroboration of 
sources is a factor enhancing  reliability and, 
therefore, enhancing  reasonable grounds for belief,” 
said Justice Cameron. However, he found that the 
trial judge erred in holding  that because the 
girlfriend and her friend were witnesses and not 
unnamed informants, the information they provided 
was more credible and therefore more reliable. 
Information from a named source is not necessarily 
more reliable  than an unnamed source. Despite this 
error, the information relied upon for the issuance of 
the search warrant was sufficiently reliable.
The search and seizure of the computer was not 
conducted in breach of s. 8, the evidence was 
admissible, and the accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
POLICE	 CONDUCT	 ASSESSED	 BY	 
WHAT	 THEY	 DID,	 NOT	 COULD	 
HAVE	 DONE
R. v. Stevenson, 2014 ONCA 842
Following  the shooting  death of a 
woman walking  from her home to 
her van a t 7 :20 pm, pol ice 
suspected her estranged husband 
may have been involved. A detective 
from the Brockville Police did not have grounds to 
arrest the accused but wanted to locate him and the 
couple’s two children. An erroneous message was 
conveyed through police dispatch to the jurisdiction 
where  the accused lived that he had shot his wife  in 
the head. At about 9:20 pm OPP  officers arrived at 
the accused’s sister’s home and saw his car parked in 
the driveway. At about 9:30 pm police saw him 
leave his sister’s house with two children and walk 
towards his car. They immediately approached him, 
ordered him to the ground at gunpoint, and 
handcuffed and searched him. At 9:42 pm he was 
placed under arrest for homicide and advised of his 
right to counsel. His hands were wrapped in plastic 
bags in anticipation of testing  them for gunshot 
residue (GSR). A lead Brockville detective arrived at 
the arrest scene at 10:08 pm and spoke with the 
accused’s mother and sister. They said the accused 
had left at 4:20 pm to go shopping  in Brockville  and 
returned at 8:20 pm. At 10:24 pm the accused was 
transported back to Brockville, the lead detective 
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believing  he had reasonable  grounds to “continue” 
the arrest. At 12:04 am the accused was advised he 
was under arrest for first degree murder, informed of 
his right to silence and advised of his right to 
counsel. At 12:35 am his hands were daubed for 
GSR, his clothing  was taken and other items from his 
vehicle were submitted for testing. As a result, GSR 
particles were both of his hands, the right sleeve of 
his jacket, and the front and back of his pants. 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The judge found the arrest, based on the 
mis in fo rmat ion p rov ided by the 
dispatcher, was unlawful but was not 
arbitrary  because the OPP officers were 
acting  in good faith in relying  on that information. 
He held that the bagging  of the accused’s hands was 
not a search or seizure and therefore did not engage 
s. 8 of the Charter. The police conduct that led to the 
obtaining  of samples - the GSR swabbing  and 
clothing  samples - occurred after the police had 
reasonable grounds to arrest the accused, rendering 
those events lawful as an incident to arrest. This 
evidence was admissible and, on the basis of other 
circumstantial evidence such as the nature of the 
shooting, motive, and opportunity, the accused was 
convicted of first degree murder.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued, among  other 
grounds, that his rights under ss. 8 
and 9 of the  Charter were infringed 
at the time of his arrest and that the 
results of the GSR testing  should have been excluded 
under s. 24(2). 
Arbitrary Detention
The accused again submitted that his arrest, based 
on the misinformation provided by the police 
dispatcher, was unlawful and therefore resulted in 
his arbitrary detention contrary to s. 9 of the Charter. 
The Crown, on the other hand, suggested that, even 
if the arrest was unlawful, the accused’s detention 
was not arbitrary because police at least had 
grounds to detain him for investigative purposes at 
the time of his arrest and, within an hour of this 
detention, had sufficient grounds to make the arrest. 
Justice Doherty, speaking  for the Court of 
Appeal, first examined the police power to make an 
arrest under s. 495(1)  of the Criminal Code. “An 
arrest without warrant is lawful if the police have 
reasonable grounds to believe that the person 
arrested has committed an indictable  offence,” he 
said. “The police must believe  that reasonable 
grounds exist (the subjective requirement)  and that 
belief must be based on information that would lead 
a reasonable person in the position of the police to 
conclude that reasonable grounds existed for the 
arrest (the objective requirement).”
BY THE BOOK:
Criminal Code: s. 495(1)
s. 495  (1) A peace officer may arrest without 
warrant
(a) a person who has committed an indictable 
offence or who, on reasonable grounds, he 
believes has committed or is about to commit 
an indictable offence;
(b) a person whom he finds committing a criminal offence;
[...]
MORE ON GUNSHOT RESIDUE (GSR)
The evidence at trial was that a GSR 
particle is not visible to the naked eye and 
contains fused elements of lead, antimony 
and barium. GSR particles are easily 
transferred by contact or air movement.  
The presence of GSR particles on any 
surface, including a person’s hands, does not 
assist in identifying how the particles came 
to be deposited on that surface. GSR 
particles could be on a person’s hands and 
clothing from (1) recently discharging a 
firearm, (2) being in close proximity when a 
firearm was discharged, or (3) picking them 
up from another surface. 
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In this case, the OPP officers were justified in 
arresting  the accused based on the information 
provided by the Brockville  police dispatcher.  But 
since the OPP  officers did not make their own 
independent assessment of the information, the 
arrest would only be lawful if the Brockville police 
had the requisite reasonable grounds for the arrest. 
“In circumstances where one officer, or one police 
force, acts on the  direction of another, the question 
of whether reasonable grounds for an arrest exist is 
answered by reference to the information available 
to the officer or police force  giving  the direction.” At 
the time of the  accused’s initial arrest, the Brockville 
police did not have reasonable grounds to do so. 
They only considered him a suspect. His arrest was 
unlawful, not being  authorized by s. 495(1)  or by 
any other law. And the detention pursuant to the 
unlawful arrest could not be saved through the 
application of the police power to detain for 
investigative purposes or to ensure the safety of the 
children. “Whatever lawful police power, apart from 
the arrest power, the police may have had to detain 
the [accused], they did not purport to exercise any 
such power,” said Justice Doherty.  He added:
The police arrested the [accused]. The police 
conduct at and after the gunpoint encounter 
with the [accused], is only consistent with a full 
arrest. The arbitrariness of the [accused’s] 
detention must be determined having regard to 
the police power actually exercised and not by 
reference to some other police power which 
may have been, but was not, exercised. 
[references omitted, para. 56]
Since the arrest was unlawful, the accused’s 
detention was arbitrary. Hence, the police “could 
not rely on that detention to justify any further 
restraint on or restriction of the [accused].” The 
bagging  of his hands in preparation of preserving 
evidence was as “an additional restricting  feature of 
the arbitrary detention that further compromised the 
[accused’s] liberty and security interests protected by 
the right against arbitrary detention.” The Court of 
Appeal did note, however, that the accused was 
lawfully arrested by the time the samples were taken 
and the clothing  seized. The police did have grounds 
to arrest at 10:24 pm, after the lead investigator had 
spoken to the accused’s mother and sister, which 
intervened between the bagging  and the actual 
taking of the samples for analysis. 
Unreasonable Search or Seizure
The accused contended that the steps taken by 
police incidental to his unlawful arrest, including  the 
bagging  of the his hands to preserve any potential 
evidence in anticipation of GSR testing, breached s. 
8 of the Charter.  
Had the accused’s arrest been lawful, the Court of 
Appeal would have found that the search of his 
pockets and bagging  of his hands for GSR testing 
was justifiable as incidental to arrest. However, the 
arrest by the OPP  was unlawful. The search could 
also not be saved as one incidental to investigative 
detention. “The arrest cannot be  converted to an 
investigative detention for the purposes of 
determining  the constitutionality of the police 
conduct,” said Justice Doherty. 
As for whether the  bagging  of the accused’s hands 
actually amounted to a search or seizure in these 
circumstances,  Justice Doherty stated:
It is somewhat artificial to describe the bagging 
of the [accused’s] hands as a search or seizure. 
The bagging is more accurately characterized as 
a step taken in preparation of an anticipated 
search or seizure. In the usual case, when the 
anticipated search or seizure follows upon the 
preparatory steps without any intervening 
compliance with the Charter, the entirety of the 
search-related conduct can be considered part of 
the s. 8 violation. In this case, however, a lawful 
arrest intervened between the step preparatory to 
the search, the bagging of the [accused’s] hands, 
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and the actual search, the taking  of the samples 
and seizure of the clothing. In this unusual 
circumstance, it therefore becomes necessary to 
draw a distinction between steps in preparation 
of a search and the search.  [para. 61]
But, as noted above, the accused was afforded 
Charter protection under s. 9 without “stretching  the 
normal meaning  of the words search or seizure to 
include the bagging  of the [accused’s] hands.” 
Justice Doherty also noted that the bagging  could 
also arguably be seen as a distinct violation of s. 7 of 
the Charter. 
Admissibility of the Evidence
The accused contended that the GSR evidence 
should have been excluded from evidence under s. 
24(2) while  the Crown opined that the results of the 
GSR testing  should be admitted. The Court of Appeal 
agreed with the Crown using  the three pronged s. 24
(2)  analysis. The evidence was admitted and the 
accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
WATCHING	 DETAINEE	 DID	 NOT	 
BREACH	 s.	 10(b)
R. v. Coaster, 2014 MBCA 108  
The police identified the  accused, a 
member of the Native Syndicate 
gang, as one of several suspects 
involved in the beating  death of 
another inmate. He was serving  a 
sentence at the time and had been recently charged 
with second degree murder in an unrelated shooting 
death. The police arranged to interview him at the 
institution where he was being  held as a maximum 
security inmate. He was taken to an interview room 
by a  correctional officer where police advised him 
he would be charged with either manslaughter or 
second degree  murder, depending  on the Crown 
Attorney’s review of the evidence. He was told of his 
rights, including  the right to consult with counsel “in 
private.” He indicated he wanted to speak to his 
lawyer.
He was taken to an office with a phone, but told the 
door to the room would remain open so the 
correctional officer would be able to keep  him in 
sight but remain out of earshot. He was also told he 
should keep his voice down so that there  was no 
chance of being  overheard. The door to the 
telephone room was left open about eight inches 
and the correctional officer was 10 feet away across 
the hallway. The police officers remained in the 
interview room with the door closed and could not 
hear the accused.  Before  the interrogation began, 
the accused told the  investigator that he had spoken 
to his lawyer. During  a 45-minute interview the 
accused admitted to striking  the victim a  couple of 
times in the jaw while he lay  unconscious on the 
floor bleeding  from the mouth. He was subsequently 
charged with second degree murder.
Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench
The accused testified that he believed the 
correctional officer would try to overhear 
him. He also said that he could hear 
voices of prison staff through the open 
door to the telephone room so he saw no point in 
keeping  his voice down. He also testified that he 
was unable to reach his lawyer. He then decided to 
make an unauthorized call to his ex-girlfriend, 
which was unsuccessful, and then lied to the 
investigator that he had spoken to his lawyer. 
The judge concluded that s. 10(b)  of the Charter had 
not been infringed. Although the door to the 
telephone room was not completely closed and a 
correctional officer was within eyesight of him, there 
was no evidence  anyone overheard his conversation. 
Furthermore, his behaviour in calling  his ex-
girlfriend, along  with the set-up for the phone 
consultation, suggested his conversation was not 
overheard. He was convicted of manslaughter.
“The arbitrariness of the [accused’s] 
detention must be determined having 
regard to the police power actually 
exercised and not by reference to some 
other police power which may have been, 
but was not, exercised.”
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Manitoba Court of Appeal
Th e a c c u s e d a p p e a l e d h i s 
conviction arguing, in part, that he 
was not given reasonable privacy 
in the exercise of his right to 
counsel. He submitted that his s. 10(b)  Charter right 
was breached because he was not alone while 
exercising  his right to retain and instruct counsel 
prior to giving  his statement but rather was under the 
watch of a correctional officer.
Justice Mainella, speaking  for the Court of Appeal, 
explained the right to consult counsel in private this 
way:
The right to privacy, so far as circumstances 
permit, is inherent in the right to retain and 
instruct counsel without delay guaranteed by s. 
10(b) of the Charter.
The level of privacy afforded to a detainee 
consulting  with counsel will be unreasonable where 
an actual invasion of privacy has been established 
such that the police did overhear a detainee’s 
conversation. The Court of Appeal also looked at 
different approaches in assessing  the reasonableness 
of privacy short of an actual invasion. Justice 
Mainella preferred a broader and more flexible 
approach such that the analysis would focus on 
reasonableness from the  detainee’s perspective, 
rather than the auditory abilities of the police. Thus, 
a s. 10(b) infringement can result where  there is a 
reasonable belief on the  part of a detainee that they 
cannot speak to counsel in private, unless the  Crown 
can demonstrate that the detainee did, in fact, speak 
to counsel in private. This reasonable belief will 
involve subjective and objective considerations. Of 
course, where the detainee unreasonably believes 
that their conversation may be overheard by the 
police there will be no s. 10(b) breach. 
In this case, the accused was afforded reasonable 
privacy under s. 10(b). First, there was no actual 
invasion of privacy. Neither the police nor the 
correctional officer could hear the accused’s 
telephone conversations. Second, the accused’s act 
in phoning  his ex-girlfriend - an unauthorized call - 
demonstrated he did not have  a reasonable belief 
that his conversation could be overheard. The trial 
judge stated and applied the correct legal principles, 
and appropriately considered the totality of the 
circumstances. The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canii.org
POLICE	 OWE	 NO	 DUTY	 TO	 
INVESTIGATE
Holmes v. White, 2014 ONSC 5809
The applicant, an employe of 
Canadian National (CN)  Railways, 
was twice charged with criminal 
offences by the CN Police Service 
for allegedly defrauding  CN. It was 
alleged that he took money that did not belong  to 
him.  Both times these charges were withdrawn by 
Crown, the second time only after a preliminary 
inquiry. CN sued the applicant claiming  damages for 
fraud and the applicant sued CN, its Police Service, 
and several of its officers for alleged misconduct in 
respect of laying  the unsuccessful criminal charges. 
He asserted that CN Police Service officers misused 
their criminal law authority to enhance CN’s 
position in its civil lawsuit by  prosecuting  him and 
his wife. He asked three police forces - London, Peel 
Region and the RCMP - to conduct a criminal 
investigation into the conduct of the CN Police 
Service.  Each of those police  forces exercised their 
discretion and declined to open investigations.  
The applicant sought mandamus - an order from a 
court compelling  a public official to perform an act 
required by law which it has neglected or refused to 
do. Here, the applicant sought a court order 
compelling  the police forces to fulfill their duties by 
undertaking  a criminal investigation into his 
complaints and laying  charges against the CN Police 
Service and its officers if warranted. 
“The right to privacy, so far as 
circumstances permit, is inherent in the 
right to retain and instruct counsel 
without delay guaranteed by s. 10(b) of 
the Charter.”
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Ontario Superior Court of Justice - Divisional Court
The judge quashed the application 
completely because, among  other 
grounds, he found mandamus was 
unavailable to compel the police to 
investigate criminal offences. In his view, the police 
do not owe a public or private law duty to 
investigate a complaint. Rather, the police have a 
discretion whether or not to proceed with an 
investigation. 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice - Divisional Court
The applicant brought a  motion for 
judicial review. He wanted the 
lower court’s quashing  of his 
application for mandamus set 
aside and the three police forces compelled to 
undertake criminal investigations. He submitted that 
case law supported the proposition that every 
alleged victim of a crime has a right to have a court 
compel the police to either investigate their 
allegations or require the police to establish in court 
that they objectively and subjectively had 
reasonable grounds to decline to investigate.  
But Justice  Matlow, speaking  for the three member 
Divisional Court, disagreed. In his view, none of the 
cases cited by the  applicant suggested that a court 
could order mandamus to compel a police force to 
investigate a  particular criminal offence at the  behest 
of an alleged victim of crime. The multi-pronged test 
for mandamus includes the requirement that there 
was a legal duty to act owed to the applicant. 
Mandamus is also unavailable  to compel (1)  the 
exercise of an unfettered discretion or (2)  a fettered 
discretion in a particular way.  In this case, the 
Divisional Court noted the applicant failed to satisfy 
the requirements for mandamus. First, as the lower 
court noted, “the police do not owe either a public 
law or private law duty to any individual to 
investigate crime.” Plus, the applicant was asking  the 
court to dictate the outcome of the police forces’ 
discretionary decisions.  All three police forces 
exercised their discretion and decided not to 
investigate the allegations made by the applicant. 
The applicant was now asking  that the police be 
compelled to investigate his allegations against the 
CN Police Service, something a court could not do:
The Court cannot issue mandamus to require a 
particular result. If the discretion of the police is 
unfettered, then it is not amenable to mandamus 
at all.  But even if the police have only a fettered 
or limited discretion, the Court may be entitled 
to require a recalcitrant office holder to make a 
decision, but the Court cannot dictate the 
outcome of the discretionary decision.   The 
applicant asks the Court to do that which the 
Supreme Court of Canada has said it cannot do. 
[para. 19]
The applicant’s motion to set aside the order 
quashing  his application for mandamus was 
dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
OFFICERS	 MAY	 USE	 EXPERIENCE	 
IN	 MAKING	 DECISIONS	 
Canada v. Tam, 2014 FCA 220
A 72 year-old female traveller 
coming  from China entered Canada 
at an International Airport in Ottawa. 
She presented a Declaration Card to 
a Canada Border Services Agency 
(CBSA)  primary inspector in which she stated she 
was not bringing  into Canada any meat or meat 
products. The primary inspector asked the traveller 
whether she had “any food items, plants or 
vegetation, candies or anything  edible” because “it 
has been [his] experience working  in the  air mode 
stream that it is more than common that individuals 
of Chinese origin returning  from China to bring 
agricultural products with them.” The traveller 
specifically  responded that she did not have any 
food or agricultural products in her bags. When 
doing  so, the  inspector noticed that the manner in 
which she responded to the food question was more 
sharp, and quick than her other responses. She also 
appeared nervous. Because of her demeanor and her 
answers, the primary  officer referred her for a 
secondary examination where pork products 
purchased in China were discovered. She was issued 
a Notice of Violation with an $800 penalty  for 
importing  an animal by-product contrary to s. 40 of 
the Health of Animals Regulation.
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Canada Agricultural Review Tribunal
The traveller filed a request for review 
before the Canada Agricultural Review 
Tribunal. The Tribunal found the primary 
inspector’s referral for the secondary 
inspection was made on the basis of race, an 
irrelevant consideration. In its view, there was direct 
evidence, through the primary inspector’s own 
report, of racial profiling. “The concept of racial 
profiling  and the  prohibitions against same, as 
developed in criminal law, are  equally applicable to 
proceedings involving  a determination to issue a 
Notice of Violation in relation to an administrative 
monetary penalty,” said the Tribunal. “To maintain 
such proceedings when racial profiling  has, as here, 
been admitted to by the Agency, would bring  the 
system of justice into disrepute.” Although the 
Tribunal imputed no bad faith in relation to the 
primary inspector’s conduct, it nonetheless 
concluded that the referral to secondary inspection 
was initially based on “discriminatory criteria” and 
this improper purpose contributed to the issuance of 
the Notice of Violation. The Tribunal found the 
Notice of Violation a nullity and the traveller was 
not liable to pay the monetary penalty. 
Federal Court of Appeal 
The Attorney General of Canada 
then sought judicial review of the 
Tribunal’s decision. Justice Nadon, 
delivering  the Court of Appeal’s 
opinion, found the Tribunal’s decision could not 
stand, citing the following reasons:
• The traveller did, in fact, bring pork products into 
Canada which she failed to declare upon entry. 
• The Tribunal failed to consider the whole of the 
evidence surrounding the primary inspector’s 
decision to refer the traveller for a secondary 
examination. Not only did the officer refer to his 
experience in making  his decision, but he made 
his decision based on the traveller’s demeanour 
and the manner in which she answered questions; 
her response to questions regarding  the 
importation of food products was more sharp, and 
quick then the other questions and she appeared 
nervous.
• There was no evidence of racial profiling. “The 
officer simply asserted in his statement that in his 
experience it was not uncommon for Chinese 
persons to bring agricultural products with them 
upon returning from China,” said Justice Nadon. 
“The officer’s hunch, based on his experience and 
his observance of the [traveller’s] demeanour, was 
confirmed by the secondary examination.”
• “Officers on the front line, such as the first officer 
herein, cannot be expected to leave their 
experience, acquired usually after many years of 
observing people from different countries entering 
Canada, at home or at a place far removed from 
their place of work.”
Justice Nadon concluded, “To find, as the Tribunal 
did in this case, that the first officer had exercised 
racial profiling  and that to not declare the Notice of 
Violation a nullity would tend to bring  the system of 
justice into disrepute is, in our respectful opinion, a 
view which is unsupportable in the circumstances of 
this case and is therefore totally devoid of merit.” 
The application for judicial review was allowed, the 
decision of the Tribunal was set aside, and the 
matter remitted for reconsideration of whether the 
traveller committed the violation and the amount of 
the penalty to be imposed.
Complete case available at www.canli.org
BY THE BOOK:
Health of Animals Regulations
s. 40   No person shall import into Canada an 
animal by-product, manure or a thing 
containing an animal by-product or manure 
except in accordance with this Part.
“Officers on the front line ... cannot be 
expected to leave their experience, 
acquired usually after many years of 
observing people from different 
countries entering Canada, at home or 
at a place far removed from their place 
of work.”
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CELL	 PHONE	 SEARCH	 INCIDENT	 
TO	 ARREST	 LAWFUL,	 BUT	 
LIMITED	 
R. v. Fearon, 2014 SCC 77
 
Following  a  robbery by two men, one 
armed with a handgun, police 
reasonably believed that there was a 
handgun on the streets and the large 
quantity of jewellery taken was 
readily-disposable. The police  wanted to locate the 
gun before it could be  used again and the jewellery 
before it could be disposed of or hidden. Later that 
evening, the accused and another man were 
arrested, but the jewellery nor the handgun had 
been found. The accused was patted down and a 
cell phone was found in his pants pocket. Police 
looked through the phone by manipulating  the key 
pad to access text messages and photographs. 
Photos of males and a gun were found along  with an 
unsent text message that read: “We did it were the 
jewelry at nigga burrrrrrrrrrr.” Police also checked 
some of the numbers called on the phone to see if 
they led to possible associates. The police eventually 
obtained a warrant to search a  getaway vehicle they 
seized and secured shortly after the robbery. The 
search revealed a loaded Smith and Wesson silver 
semi-automatic handgun. The police also obtained a 
warrant some months later to search and download 
the contents of the cell phone, but no new evidence 
was discovered. The accused was charged with 
robbery and other offences.
Ontario Court of Justice
The accused argued that the search of his 
cell phone breached s. 8  of the Charter 
and that the evidence ought to have been 
excluded under s. 24(2). The judge 
disagreed and found that the search of the cell 
phone was incident to arrest. He held the search was 
directed at public safety  (locating  the hand gun), 
avoiding  the loss of evidence (the stolen jewellery), 
and obtaining  evidence of the crime (information 
linking  the accused to the robbery and locating 
potential accomplices). In the judge’s view, the 
officer reasonably believed that the cell phone might 
contain evidence of the robbery. “I find that there 
was a reasonable prospect of securing  evidence of 
the offence for which the accused was being 
arrested in searching  the contents of the  cell phone,” 
said the judge. “In particular, it was reasonable for 
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had communication through the cell phone before, 
during  or after the robbery with other perpetrators or 
with third parties.” Plus, police said it was important 
to follow up all leads immediately  because they  still 
had jewellery, a firearm and an unidentified suspect 
outstanding. There was no s. 8  violation and the 
photos and text message were admissible. The judge 
found that the gun recovered from the car was used 
in the  robbery  and was the one depicted in the 
photo found on the accused’s cell phone. He was 
convicted of robbery with a firearm and related 
offences.
Ontario Court of Appeal
T h e a c c u s e d ’s a p p e a l w a s 
unanimously dismissed. The Court of 
Appeal upheld the trial judge’s 
conclusion that the search was 
incident to arrest and there was no s. 8  Charter 
breach. The initial search by the arresting  officer was 
within the ambit of the power to search incident to 
arrest.  The police reasonably believed that they 
might find relevant evidence.  The Court of Appeal 
found it unnecessary and declined to create an 
exception to the power of search incident to arrest 
with respect to cell phones given the fact the cell 
phone was not password-protected or otherwise 
“locked.” However, the Court of Appeal suggested 
that it would not have been appropriate to search a 
locked phone without a warrant.  The accused's 
appeal was dismissed.
Supreme Court of Canada
The accused again appealed, submitting  that the 
draft text message and photos found by the police on 
his cell phone were inadmissible because the search 
was unreasonable under s. 8. In his view, the police 
did not have the common law power to search his 
cell phone incident to his arrest.  
Majority
A four member majority of the 
Supreme Court found that cell 
phones could be searched as an 
incident to arrest, subject to 
certain limitations. In doing  so, the majority noted 
that a weighing  of competing  interests was required; 
the  public  purposes served by effective law 
enforcement versus respect for the liberty  and 
fundamental dignity of individuals (everyone’s right 
to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures). 
The general framework of the common law power to 
search incident to arrest permits searches without a 
warrant even where there are  no grounds to obtain a 
warrant and exigent circumstances do not exist.  
Justice  Cromwell, speaking  for the majority, 
described the general requirements this way:
The common law framework requires that a 
search incident to arrest must be founded on a 
lawful arrest, be truly incidental to that arrest 
and be conducted reasonably. [para. 27]
The majority, however, went on to modify the 
general common law power in a way that would 
recognize the potentially significant informational 
privacy in a cell phone and the invasion that would 
result from a search of it by placing  meaningful 
limits on the purpose, manner and extent of a cell 
phone search. Thus, a search of a cell phone or 
Cell phones in this context include “smart phones” - 
the functional equivalent of a computer. The majority 
noted that the privacy afforded individuals in a cell 
phone did not necessarily depend on whether the 
phone was password protected. Justice Cromwell 
stated:
I would not give this factor very  much weight in 
assessing either an individual’s  subjective 
expectation of privacy or whether that expectation is 
reasonable. An individual’s decision not to 
password protect his or her cell phone does not 
indicate any  sort of  abandonment of the significant 
privacy interests one generally will have in the 
contents of the phone.  ...Cell phones — locked or 
unlocked — engage significant privacy interests.
“The common law framework requires 
that a search incident to arrest must be 
founded on a lawful arrest, be truly 
incidental to that arrest and be 
conducted reasonably.” 
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similar device will not be permissible on every 
arrest. Rather, the  following  factors will be required 
for a reasonable search of a cell phone:
✓ The arrest must be lawful;
✓ The search  must be truly incidental to the 
arrest. The police  must have a reason based on 
a valid law enforcement purpose to conduct the 
search, and that reason is objectively 
reasonable. Valid law enforcement purposes 
are: 
๏ Protecting the police, the accused, or the 
public;
๏ Preserving evidence; or
๏ Discovering evidence, including  locating 
additional suspects, in situations in which 
the investigation will be stymied or 
significantly hampered absent the ability  to 
promptly  search the cell phone incident to 
arrest. However, “if ... all suspects are in 
custody and any firearms and stolen 
property have been recovered, it is hard to 
see how police could show that the prompt 
search of a  suspect’s cell phone could be 
considered truly incidental to the arrest as it 
serves no immediate investigative purpose. 
This will mean, in practice, that cell phone 
searches are not routinely permitted simply 
for the purpose of discovering  additional 
evidence. The search power must be used 
with great circumspection. It also means, in 
practice, that the police  will have to be 
prepared to explain why it was not practical 
(and I emphasize that this does not mean 
impossible), in all the circumstances of the 
investigation, to postpone the search until 
they could obtain a warrant;”
✓ The nature and the extent of the search must 
be tailored to the purpose of the search. As the 
majority stated, “generally, even when a cell 
phone search is permitted because it is truly 
incidental to the arrest, only recently sent or 
drafted emails, texts, photos and the call log 
may be examined as in most cases only those 
sorts of items will have the necessary link to the 
purposes for which prompt examination of the 
device  is permitted. But these are not rules, and 
other searches may in some circumstances be 
justified. The test is whether the nature and 
extent of the search are tailored to the purpose 
for which the search may lawfully be 
conducted;” and
✓ The police  must take detailed notes of what 
they have examined on the device and how it 
was searched. “[O]fficers must make detailed 
notes of what they have examined on the cell 
phone,” said Justice Cromwell. “In my view, 
given that we are dealing  here  with an 
extraordinary  search power that requires 
neither a  warrant nor reasonable and probable 
grounds, the obligation to keep  a careful record 
of what is searched and how it was searched 
should be  imposed as a  matter of constitutional 
imperative. The record should generally include 
the applications searched, the extent of the 
search, the time of the search, its purpose and 
its duration. After-the-fact judicial review is 
especially important where, as in the case of 
searches incident to arrest, there is no prior 
authorization. Having  a clear picture of what 
was done is important to such review being 
effective. In addition, the record keeping 
requirement is likely to have the incidental 
effect of helping  police  officers focus on the 
question of whether their conduct in relation to 
the phone falls squarely within the parameters 
of a lawful search incident to arrest.”
“The law enforcement objectives served by searches incident to arrest will generally be 
most compelling in the course of the investigation of crimes that involve, for example, 
violence or threats of violence, or that in some other way put public safety at risk, such as 
the robbery in this case, or serious property offences that involve readily disposable 
property, or drug trafficking.”
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In modifying  the general framework, the  majority 
notably rejected the following approaches:
(1) A categorical prohibition against searching  a 
cell phone without a warrant; 
(2) Imposing  a requirement that officers have 
reasonable grounds to believe that evidence of 
the offence will be found on the cell phone; or
(3) A prohibition of cell phone searches in all but 
exigent circumstances.
In this case, the majority found the accused’s arrest 
for robbery was lawful. The searches of the cell 
phone leading  to the text message and the  photos 
were also truly incidental to the arrest. They were 
conducted for valid law enforcement objectives and 
were appropriately linked to the  offence for which 
the accused had been lawfully arrested. However, 
the searches were nonetheless held to be 
unreasonable and therefore a s. 8  breach because 
there  was no “detailed evidence about precisely 
what was searched, how and why.”
Admissibility
Despite  the Charter breach, the evidence was 
admitted under s. 24(2). The police acted in good 
faith, which favoured admission. The dominant view 
at the time of the arrest was that cell phone searches 
incident to arrest were permissible. “Of course, the 
police cannot choose the least onerous path 
whenever there is a gray area in the law,” said Justice 
Cromwell. “In general, faced with real uncertainty, 
the police should err on the side of caution by 
choosing  a course of action that is more respectful of 
the accused’s potential privacy rights. But here, if the 
police faced a gray area, it was a very  light shade of 
gray, and they  had good reason to believe, as they 
did, that what they were doing  was perfectly legal.” 
As for the impact on the accused’s Charter protected 
interests, the accused’s informational privacy 
interests were not gravely impacted. This factor 
weakly favoured exclusion. Finally, the evidence 
was cogent and reliable. Society’s interest in the 
adjudication of the case on its merits favoured 
admission. Overall, the admission of the evidence 
would not bring  the administration of justice into 
disrepute.
Crimes Types
The majority hinted that some crimes will more 
likely justify a limited search of cell phones:
Beyond the facts of this case, there are other 
types of situations in which cell phone searches 
conducted incidental to a lawful arrest will serve 
important law enforcement objectives, including 
public safety. Cell phones are used to facilitate 
criminal activity. For example, cell phones “are 
the ‘bread and butter’ of the drug trade and the 
means by which drugs are marketed on the 
street”. Prompt access by law enforcement to the 
contents of a cell phone may serve the purpose 
of identifying accomplices or locating and 
preserving evidence that might otherwise be lost 
or destroyed. Cell phones may also be used to 
evade or resist law enforcement. An individual 
may be a “scout” for drug smugglers, using a cell 
phone to warn criminals that police are in the 
vicinity or to call for “back up” to help resist law 
enforcement officers. In such situations, a review 
of recent calls or text messages may help to 
locate the other perpetrators before they can 
either escape or dispose of the drugs and reveal 
the need to warn officers of possible impending 
danger. [references omitted, para. 48]
And further:
The law enforcement objectives served by 
searches incident to arrest will generally be most 
compelling in the course of the investigation of 
crimes that involve, for example, violence or 
threats of violence, or that in some other way 
put public safety at risk, such as the robbery in 
this case, or serious property offences that 
involve readily disposable property, or drug 
trafficking. Generally speaking, these types of 
crimes are most likely to justify some limited 
search of a cell phone incident to arrest, given 
the law enforcement objectives. Conversely, a 
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search of a cell phone incident to arrest will 
generally not be justified in relation to minor 
offences. [para. 79]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
 Another View
A th r ee membe r m ino r i t y 
concluded that police officers are 
not entitled to search a mobile 
phone found in the possession or 
vicinity of an accused person upon arrest unless 
there were exigent circumstances to do so:
The intensely personal and uniquely pervasive 
sphere of privacy in our personal computers 
requires protection that is clear, practical and 
effective.  An overly complicated template, such 
as the one proposed by the majority, does not 
ensure sufficient protection.  Only judicial pre-
authorization can provide the effective and 
impart ial balancing  of the state’s law 
enforcement objectives with the privacy interests 
in our personal computers. Thus, I conclude that 
the police must obtain a warrant before they can 
search an arrested person’s phone or other 
personal digital communications device.   Our 
common law already provides flexibility where 
there are exigent circumstances ― when the 
safety of the officer or the public is at stake, or 
when a search is necessary to prevent the 
destruction of evidence. [para. 105]
Thus, the minority would permit a  warrantless search 
of a cell phone incident to arrest in cases of exigent 
circumstances. This requires either a reasonable 
basis to suspect a search may prevent an imminent 
threat to safety or reasonable grounds to believe  that 
the imminent loss or destruction of evidence may be 
prevented by a warrantless search.  
In this case, the police were required to obtain a 
warrant before searching  the phone because they 
did not have exigent circumstances, although they 
were entitled to seize the phone pending  an 
application for a warrant. The  evidence, being 
unconstitutionally obtained, would have been 
excluded by the minority and the accused’s appeal 
allowed.
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
INFORMATION	 COMPELLING,	 
CREDIBLE	 &	 CORROBORATED:	 
RGB	 SATISFIED
R. v. Williams, 2014 ONCA 908 
Just after 4:00 pm the police received 
a tip  from a known confidential 
informant that a black male  in his 
early twenties was dealing  cocaine 
from his car –  a black four-door 
Mazda.  The informant said the car was parked 
outside a  residence and provided the address. The 
police attended the address and watched it. At about 
4:50 pm they saw a young  black male (the accused) 
driving  a black four-door Mazda arrive. He went into 
the residence, stayed for about a minute  and 
returned to his car. He was arrested and searched, 
along  with his car, as an incident to arrest. As a 
result of the search, the police charged him with 
possessing  cocaine, oxycodone and heroin for the 
purpose of trafficking  (PPT)  and possession of the 
proceeds of crime exceeding $5,000. 
Ontario Court of Justice
The judge  found that the police  had 
reasonable and probable grounds to arrest 
the accused. He accepted police 
testimony that, at the time of the arrest, 
they subjectively believed they had grounds to 
arrest.  As for the objective reasonableness of that 
belief, the informant was credible, the information 
provided was compelling, and the information was 
corroborated.  Although the search of the car was 
warrantless and presumptively unreasonable, it was 
properly conducted as an incident to lawful arrest. 
The drugs and money found in the search of the car 
were admissible and the accused was convicted of 
all charges except for PPT heroin, which was 
reduced to simple possession.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused contended that the trial 
judge erred in finding  that the police 
had reasonable and probable grounds 
to arrest him. He argued that the 
police lacked the necessary subjective belief 
because  they testified they did not believe they had 
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sufficient grounds to obtain a warrant to search the 
residence on the basis of the information the 
informant provided.  He suggested that the police 
used the arrest and search incident to arrest to 
circumvent the higher requirement for a search 
warrant. 
The Court of Appeal disagreed. First, the test for a 
search warrant was inapplicable. Further, the test for 
a search warrant is different than the test for 
reasonable grounds to arrest.  Moreover, the police 
evidence about whether there were grounds to 
obtain a  search warrant for the residence related 
only  to the information they obtained from the 
informant, not whether they had the requisite 
grounds at the time of arrest. At the time of arrest, 
the informant’s information had been corroborated 
and further observations were made of the accused 
going in and out of the residence.    
The accused also submitted that the officers’ 
subjective belief was not objectively reasonable. He 
contended that (1) the informant information 
provided was not compelling  (it lacked meaningful 
detail), (2)  the informant’s credibility  was suspect (it 
had not been proven that his criminal record did not 
include dishonesty  offences), and (3) the information 
was not sufficiently  corroborated. This ground of 
appeal was also rejected. The Court of Appeal stated:
The objective reasonableness of the arrest must 
be viewed through the lens of the arresting 
o f f i ce r s .They we re expe r i enced d rug 
enforcement officers.The information the 
informant provided contained details relating to 
a description of the suspect and his car and a 
specific address where he would be at a specific 
time.  Significantly, the address was one known 
to the police to be associated with the drug 
trade.  These details elevated the information to 
more than mere rumour or gossip. Furthermore, 
the information came from an informant with 
considerable credibility given the reliability of 
information he had previously provided the 
police on many occasions. While the informant’s 
entire criminal record was not put into evidence, 
he or she nonetheless could only be described 
as a “gold standard informant”. 
Finally, the information the informant provided 
was corroborated by the arrival of a young black 
man driving a four-door black Mazda at the 
address the informant gave the police.  Of 
additional corroborative significance was the 
[accused’s] brief trip inside the residence – 
conduct the experienced police officers 
identified as indicative of a drug transaction in a 
residence they knew was used for such a 
purpose. [paras. 14-15]
In this case, the trial judge considered all the 
relevant factors when assessing  reliability  in their 
totality  - compelling  information from a credible 
informant that was corroborated. The judge did not 
err in concluding  that, at the time of arrest, the 
police officers had reasonable and probable 
grounds. The judge also properly  recognized that a 
weakness in one area of the reliability assessment 
may be compensated by strengths in the other two. 
The accused’s appeal against conviction was 
dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
REASONABLE	 GROUNDS	 
ASSESSED	 AT	 TIME	 OF	 ARREST
R. v. Day, 2014 SCC 74
 
A police investigator received a tip 
from a reliable informant that the 
a c c u s e d a n d h i s r o o m m a t e 
possessed quantities of marihuana, 
cocaine, and steroids for sale.  That 
same day the investigator corroborated some of the 
tip’s details, including  the accused and his 
roommate's address, the vehicles they drove, and 
the roommate’s involvement in selling  drugs.  The 
investigator also learned that a year earlier the 
accused had been found in possession of marihuana 
and a set of digital scales, though he  had not been 
“The objective reasonableness of the 
arrest must be viewed through the lens 
of the arresting officers.They were 
experienced drug enforcement 
officers.”
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charged at that time. The  accused’s residence was 
placed under surveillance and he was seen leaving  it 
and driving  off in a black  Honda Civic at 3:25 pm, a 
vehicle the investigator was informed he would be 
driving.  After  stopping  at a  convenience store, a 
man came out of the store and got into the accused’s 
car. The officers were unable to see what happened 
in the car or when exactly the man got out of it, but 
they saw the car drive away and followed it. The 
accused parked it and then entered a downtown bar.
Meanwhile, the investigator appeared before a 
judge, obtained a search warrant at 4:00 pm and let 
the surveillance officers know. About half an hour 
later, the surveillance officers observed the accused 
exit the bar with two women and walk to the  Honda 
Civic that was parked nearby. When he got into the 
driver’s seat and started the car he was confronted by 
police and arrested for trafficking. The women were 
advised that they could leave and did so. A search of 
the accused’s person yielded two cell phones and 
some cash. He was cautioned, informed of his 
Charter rights and placed in a  police car. When the 
police searched his car they found a small quantity 
of marihuana, a  bud buster and a used marihuana 
pipe.  Two zip lock bags, each containing  a half 
pound of marihuana, were found in the trunk.  The 
accused was charged with possessing  marihuana for 
the purpose of trafficking.
Newfoundland Provincial Court
During  testimony the investigator said he 
waited for the warrant to issue before 
arresting  the accused because he wanted 
to minimize the risk that the  arrest could 
prompt contact with someone at the residence and 
result in the destruction of evidence. On cross-
examination the investigator did not want to 
speculate as to what he would have done had the 
search warrant not been issued.The judge found that 
the accused’s arrest was unlawful and that his 
Charter rights to be free from arbitrary detention (s. 
9)  and unreasonable search and seizure (s. 8) had 
been breached.  In the judge’s view, the police did 
not have the requisite subjective belief for arresting 
the accused because the officer could not say 
whether he would have ordered the arrest if the 
search warrant had not been issued. As well, the 
judge found that a reasonable person placed in the 
position of the police would not be able  to conclude 
that there were reasonable grounds for the arrest. 
She excluded the marihuana, cell phones and drug 
paraphernalia from evidence under s. 24(2)  of the 
Charter. As a result, the accused was acquitted.
Newfoundland Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed the accused’s 
acquittal on the basis that the  trial 
judge erred in ruling  that the arrest 
was unlawful and that ss. 8 and 9 of 
the Charter were  breached. In the Crown’s opinion, 
the investigating  officer ordering  the arrest had the 
necessary  subjective  belief that the accused was 
committing  or was about to commit a drug 
trafficking  offence and that this belief was justifiable 
from an objective point of view. Furthermore, the 
Crown contended that even if the accused’s Charter 
rights were  breached the judge erred in excluding 
the marihuana, cell phones and drug  paraphernalia 
as evidence.  
Arrest
Justice Hoegg, authoring  a majority  judgment, first 
noted that “the reasonable grounds for arresting  a 
person without a warrant encompass both 1)  a 
subjective belief on the part of the police that the 
person has committed or is about to commit an 
indictable offence, and 2)  that the subjective belief 
must be ‘justifiable from an objective point of view’.” 
“[T]he reasonable grounds for arresting a person without a warrant encompass both 1) a 
subjective belief on the part of the police that the person has committed or is about to 
commit an indictable offence, and 2) that the subjective belief must be ‘justifiable from an 
objective point of view’.
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Subjective Belief
The majority concluded that the officer had the 
requisite subjective belief. At no time did the officer 
say his grounds for arrest depended on the warrant 
being  issued nor was there  any evidence that his 
belief hinged on such a case. Justice Hoegg stated:
[I]t is worth observing that a decision to arrest 
can involve more than simply having the 
requisite grounds.  The fact that the officer may 
not have arrested [the accused] had the warrant 
not been issued does not mean that the officer’s 
subjective belief was vitiated, or that his grounds 
were not objectively justifiable. The police may 
have a subjective belief that is objectively 
justifiable to arrest a person whom they choose 
not to arrest, and the fact that the arrest is not 
carried out does not mean that the police do not 
have the grounds. [para. 25]
The investigator’s subjective belief for the arrest was 
what he personally believed at the  time it was 
made. What his belief might have been in a different 
set of circumstances was irrelevant. Here, the judge 
focussed on the investigator’s answers to 
hypothetical questions respecting  the warrant not 
being  issued.  Since there was no evidence linking 
the investigator’s belief in grounds for arrest to the 
warrant’s issuance, the evidence respecting  the 
hypotheticals was not relevant. It was an error in law 
for the trial judge to not apply the proper legal 
standard. She was required to consider only the 
relevant evidence respecting  the  investigator’s 
subjective belief. Had she done so, the trial judge 
would have determined that the investigator had the 
requisite subjective belief. The trial judge also made 
a palpable and overriding  error by inferring  that the 
investigator lacked a subjective belief from his 
hesitation to answer a hypothetical question if the 
warrant had not been issued. 
Objective Grounds
Justice Hoegg  found the trial judge also erred in 
concluding  the objective test for reasonable grounds 
had not been satisfied. The informant was very 
reliable, provided information from first hand 
knowledge and some of the details were verified like 
the accused’s address and type of vehicle he drove. 
In addition, there was independent verification that 
the accused had been involved with drugs on a prior 
occasion. Had the trial judge properly  considered 
the correct legal principles, she would have 
concluded, in the  totality  of the circumstances, that 
the grounds for arresting  the accused were 
objectively justifiable. “The tip itself provided detail 
beyond a bald conclusionary statement that [the 
accused] was trafficking  in drugs, some of the details 
were corroborated, the  reliability of Source  B was 
very high and his or her source was first hand, and 
additional investigation and surveillance served to 
support the belief in grounds,” said Justice Hoegg. 
Since both the subjective and objective prongs of the 
reasonable grounds test had been met, the  accused’s 
arrest was lawful and he was, therefore, not 
arbitrarily detained under s. 9 of the Charter.
The Search
Under the  common law doctrine of search incident 
to arrest, the police may search without a  warrant 
provided (1) the arrest was lawful, (2)  the search was 
conducted incident to the arrest for a valid purpose, 
and (3)  the manner in which the search was carried 
out was reasonable. Valid purposes for conducting 
searches incident to arrest include protecting  the 
police, and protecting  and discovering  evidence 
related to the arrest.
“The police may have a subjective belief 
that is objectively justifiable to arrest a 
person whom they choose not to 
arrest, and the fact that the arrest is 
not carried out does not mean that the 
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In this case, the police searched the accused and his 
car for the purpose of discovering  evidence, a valid 
reason for searching  incident to arrest. Furthermore, 
the public manner of the search did not taint its 
reasonableness. Justice Hoegg stated:
In my view, the time and place of the search 
were called for in the circumstances. There was 
nothing  abusive about the search of [the 
accused] and nothing done to him or in the 
searching  of his car that could lead to the 
conclusion that the search was carried out in an 
unreasonable manner. While respect for the 
privacy and dignity of accused persons is always 
called for, the police cannot be expected to 
conduct their work at times and places which 
are optimal from the point of view of persons 
involved in investigations. Accordingly, I 
conclude that the search was carried out in a 
reasonable manner. [para. 68]
The searches of the accused and his car were 
lawfully conducted incident to his arrest, and there 
was no s. 8  Charter breach.  The marihuana, cell 
phones, and drug  paraphernalia were admissible as 
evidence. 




Justice Rowe, in dissent, concluded that 
the arresting  officer did not believe he 
had reasonable  grounds independent of 
the search warrant being  granted. Instead, 
he believed he had grounds, in part, because the 
search warrant had been granted. Since the arresting 
officer couldn’t say whether he  would have had 
grounds to make the arrest in the absence of the 
search warrant being  issued, then the  subjective 
prong  of the test had not been made out. The 
inference the trial judge drew that the arresting 
officer did not subjectively have reasonable grounds 
for the arrest was logical. As for the objective test, 
Justice Rowe found it too had not been satisfied. 
Since the arrest was arbitrary and unlawful, a search 
incidental to such an arrest would also be unlawful. 
“The arrest of [the accused] was a  clear abuse of 
authority, one that warrants censure by the courts,” 
said Justice Rowe. In his view, the evidence was 
properly excluded and he would have dismissed the 
Crown’s appeal.
Supreme Court of Canada
The accused then appealed, 
again arguing  the arresting 
officer did not subjectively or 
objectively have reasonable and 
probable grounds to arrest him. 
Thus, he contended the arrest 
without a warrant under s. 495(1) of the Criminal 
Code  was not lawful nor was the incidental search of 
his vehicle that followed. 
A five judge panel of the Supreme Court heard the 
appeal. But they had very little to say other than 
dismissing  the appeal for the reasons of Justice 
Hoegg. Thus, the Newfoundland Court of Appeal’s 
decision was upheld and the order of a new trial 
affirmed.
Editor’s note: Case facts and Newfoundland Court 
of Appeal decision taken from R. v. Day, 2014 NLCA 
14.
PENILE	 SWAB	 &	 FINGERNAIL	 
CLIPPINGS	 PROPER	 AS	 
INCIDENT	 TO	 ARREST
R. v. Harasemow, 2014 BCSC 2287
The accused encountered a drunk 
women in his apartment building. 
She had left a friend’s apartment and 
was wandering  about the hallways. 
She willingly went to the accused’s 
apartment where she claimed she was held prisoner 
in his bedroom for over an hour, during  which time 
he had vaginal intercourse without a condom, 
attempted anal intercourse and had her perform oral 
sex. Eventually she managed to get to the balcony of 
his apartment and yelled for help, attracting  the 
attention of a man who called police. The accused 
was arrested at his apartment and taken to the police 
station where he was booked into a cell. As an 
incident to his arrest, his clothing  was seized, his 
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hands and penis were swabbed, and his finger nails 
were clipped. As a result of the police investigation, 
the accused was charged with sexual assault causing 
bodily harm and unlawful confinement. 
British Columbia Supreme Court
At a trial voir dire the accused submitted 
that his Charter rights under s.  8, and 
perhaps s. 7, had been breached and that 
the bodily  samples obtained were 
inadmissible under s. 24(2). 
Since no warrant was obtained, the onus was on the 
Crown to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that 
the searches were reasonable by showing  they were 
(1)  authorized by law; (2) the law itself was 
reasonable; and (3)  the manner in which the 
searches were carried out were reasonable. In 
describing  the power of the police to search as an 
incident to arrest, Justice McKinnon stated:
A search is authorized by law if it is conducted 
as an incident to a lawful arrest. Three conditions 
must be satisfied in order for a search to be valid 
under the common law power of search incident 
to arrest: (1) the arrest must be lawful; (2) the 
search must have been conducted as an incident 
to the lawful arrest; (3) the manner in which the 
search is carried out must be reasonable. [para. 
17]
Penile Swab
Justice McKinnon found the taking  of the penile 
swab in the  circumstances of this case was lawful as 
incidental to arrest. He analyzed the penile swab 
under the framework for a strip  search, which 
requires (1) a lawful arrest, (2) a search related to the 
purpose of arrest, such as to preserve evidence or 
prevent its disposal, (3) reasonable and probable 
grounds that a  strip search was necessary  in the 
circumstances, and (4)  the strip search must be 
conducted in a reasonable manner: 
I have concluded that reasonable and probable 
grounds to justify a strip search were present in 
the case at bar. [A sergeant] testified that he was 
informed the accused had forced sexual 
intercourse on the victim without a condom. He 
testified that the nature of the alleged crime 
suggested that the complainant’s DNA was likely 
on the suspect’s penis or underneath his 
fingernails, given the proximity of time and the 
fact that the accused appeared not to have 
showered or otherwise made any attempt to 
remove evidence.
[A constable] also testified that time was of the 
essence, and she needed to obtain the evidence 
without delay to ensure that it would not be lost. 
The presence of the bodily fluids was transitory 
and fleeting, as it could be quickly dissipated 
through urination, sweating or washing.
I accept that the search was also necessary in the 
sense that the alternative procedure would have 
resulted in a greater violation of the accused’s 
personal dignity. The penile swab involved a 
period of 15 to 20 seconds which violated the 
accused’s privacy. [Another constable] testified 
that the alternative option would have required 
officers to keep [the accused] in handcuffs and 
under constant supervision until a general search 
warrant could be obtained, which could take up 
to 12 hours. He would also require assistance 
eating or using the bathroom, which would 
clearly violate his privacy in a far great capacity. 
[paras. 24-26]
The strip search, therefore, did not breach s. 8  of the 
Charter.
The bodily substances obtained by the penile swab 
was also properly authorized incident to the arrest:
In Stillman, the Court held that a search warrant 
is required when taking bodily samples from a 
suspect. In that case, police took hair samples, 
buccal swabs and dental impressions from the 
accused. The Court determined that a higher 
standard of justification is required when the 
search and seizure incident to arrest infringes 
upon a person’s bodily integrity, which may 
constitute the ultimate affront to human dignity. 
The common law power must be limited, as 
DNA is personal and its permanence eliminates 
the need for haste.
... ... ...
However, in Stillman, what the police sought 
from the individual in question were samples of 
his own bodily substances. These samples were 
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taken for the sole purpose of comparing 
Mr.  Stillman’s DNA with other DNA evidence 
found at the crime scene.
... ... ...
At bar, the DNA in question was not personal to 
the accused. Rather, ... the police sought the 
bodily samples of the complainant that were 
present on the surface of the accused’s skin. 
Although the area swabbed in the case at bar 
was more intimate than an elbow or ear lobe, 
the evidence seized did not result in an affront to 
the accused’s human dignity, as his right to 
privacy related to the information within his 
DNA was intact.
Further, the case at bar is not similar to Stillman 
where there was “simply no possibility of the 
evidence sought being destroyed if it was not 
seized immediately” given that the accused’s 
DNA would not change overtime . In contrast at 
bar, the evidence that the police sought to 
preserve was at imminent risk of destruction. [An 
expert] confirmed that DNA on skin and under 
fingernails degrades quickly, and would not last 
longer than 24 hours.
Thus, Stillman differs factually from the case at 
bar. The DNA sought in Stillman was that of the 
accused, which was in no danger of being  lost/
destroyed, whereas, at bar ..., the DNA sought 
was that of the alleged victim, which was in 
imminent danger of being lost/destroyed. 
[references omitted, paras. 29-35]
The seizure of bodily substances obtained from the 
penile swab were admissible.
Fingernail Clippings 
The fingernail clippings were also obtained lawfully 
incidental to arrest. Justice McKinnon stated:
Clipping  the accused’s fingernails was arguably 
more intrusive than taking  the penile swab, since 
it resulted in the actual seizure of bodily 
substances from the accused. However, the 
purpose remained the same: to retrieve the 
complainant’s DNA.
[A sergeant] testified that he had reasonable 
grounds to believe that the accused’s fingernails 
would carry the complainant’s DNA because 
sexual assault often involves manhandling  the 
victim, and sexual intercourse produces bodily 
secretions that can be deposited underneath 
fingernails. The seizure at bar did not violate the 
same informational privacy interest of the 
accused, as it had in Stillman, as the fingernails 
themselves were never analyzed to obtain the 
accused’s DNA.
Unlike Stillman, the evidence from the 
fingernails was also fragile. [The constable] 
testified that although genetic material can be 
obtained by either clipping or scraping, clipping 
is preferred in sexual assault cases, as in her 
experience, scraping often results in a very small 
sample that can fall off the scraper. She believed 
that it was urgent to retrieve the evidence from 
under the nail, as it can be lost through every 
day contact or tampered with. Although she was 
unsure how long  the material would stay under 
the nail, in her opinion it is hours, rather than 
days.
In the result, although clipping  an individual’s 
fingernails may be more intrusive than swabbing 
one’s skin, this seizure in the circumstances is 
distinguishable from Stillman and was a lawful 
search incident to arrest. [paras. 38-40]
The Court also found there did “not appear to be  any 
warrant available that could authorize police to 
obtain a  suspect’s fingernail clippings in the present 
circumstances”:
Although a general warrant would authorize 
fingernail scrapings, it would likely not authorize 
full fingernail clippings, as s. 487.01(2) prohibits 
general warrants from authorizing “interference 
with the bodily integrity of any person”.
A DNA warrant would also be inappropriate in 
the case at bar. Sections 487.04 to 487.09 of the 
Code authorize search warrants for the purpose 
of seizing  bodily substances for forensic DNA 
testing. In particular, s.  487.05 authorizes the 
seizure of a suspect’s bodily substances in order 
to compare his or her DNA with the DNA 
associated with the crime. At bar, the fingernail 
clippings themselves were not analyzed, and 
were only seized to more easily obtain the 
complainant’s DNA.
Section 487.06(1) also limits the seizure of 
bodily samples to plucking hairs, taking buccal 
swabs and taking blood by pricking the surface 
of the skin.
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The Crown cited s.  489(2) of the Code as 
confirming  the common law duty of police to 
secure and preserve evidence without a 
warrant. ...
While it might be argued that this broad power 
of warrantless search and seizure might 
authorize fingernail clippings, the lack of clear 
statutory authority militates against that finding, 
particularly given the Court’s view in Stillman as 
to the seriousness with which it regards the 
taking of bodily samples. In the result, it would 
appear that the taking of clippings is only 
authorized as a search incident to arrest. [paras. 
43-47]
The Court also found the seizure of the accused’s 
fingernail clippings did not engage s.  7 of the 
C h a r t e r . Th e p hy s i c a l i n t e r f e r e n c e a n d 
inconvenience of cutting  the accused’s fingernails 
had been adequately addressed under s. 8 and s. 7 
added nothing to the analysis. 
The evidence obtained from the penile swab  and 
fingernail clippings were admissible at trial.
Complete case available www.courts.gov.bc.ca
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